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Abstract
A standard framework for the analysis of investment opportunities in the literature of corpo-
rate nance is the real options approach. The real options approach examines the value and
timing of investment projects building on the idea that the opportunity to invest in a project is
analogous to a nancial option on a real asset. This means that, when evaluating an investment
opportunity characterized by uncertainty and irreversibility, the potential investor needs to fac-
tor in that, at the time of the investment, s/he forgoes the option to postpone the investment
decision for some future time point when the uncertainty will be, naturally, partly resolved.
With the real options approach as a starting point, this thesis is comprised by three papers
examining primarily investments undertaken in a supply-chain setting (paper 1 and paper 2)
and, secondarily, projects aiming at land development (paper 3).
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Innovation is an important factor for a companys success and a crucial explanation for observed
di¤erentials in performance (McGrath and Nerkar, 2004). Consequently, a fundamental problem
that a rm faces has to do with the decision to invest in a new product, technology or service
market. As noted by Miller and Modigliani (1961), a signicant part of many rmsmarket
values consists of such future growth opportunities i.e. assets not yet in place. Myers (1977)
argued that these assets are analogous to nancial options, in the sense that one has the right
but not the obligation to invest, and consequently stock option pricing methods should be used
for their evaluation.
The real options approach acknowledges that investment opportunities are options on real
assets and provides a way to apply option pricing methods to investment decision problems.
It claims that the classic net present value rule is not always valid and argues that the option
to postpone an investment decision characterized by uncertainty and irreversibility has to be
taken into account. McDonald and Siegel (1986) gave an expression for the option value and
showed that the optimal investment strategy is a trigger strategy in the sense that one should
invest as soon as the project value is greater than a threshold, the value of which increases with
uncertainty.1
Departing from the standard real options approach presentation, my goal in this thesis is
to examine how the investment timing and the value of the opportunity to invest are a¤ected
1See e.g. Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
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by factors that are beyond the potential investors control, such as the special attributes of the
industry (paper 1 and paper 2) and the relevant legislative framework (paper 3).
In the rst chapter of my thesis I examine the case of a potential investor who contemplates
entering an uncertain new market under two conditions. On one hand, the completion of
the investment is conditional on the participation of an investment partner who is willing to
bear some of the investment cost receiving compensation in return, whereas, on the other, a
prerequisite for the project to take place is the purchase of a discrete input from an upstream
rm with market power.
Beginning with the former, according to Chesbrough and Schwartz (2007), timely invest-
ments are often beyond the resources of a single rm and, as a result, an investment partner
willing to share the cost of betting on the success of the business plan under consideration is fre-
quently sought after (Kogut, 1991).2 Of course, the investment partner anticipates nancial (or
other3) returns and this is what makes the interaction between the two associates particularly
challenging.4
At the same time, as Billette de Villemeur et al. (2014) point out, the investment is not
always performed in-house, as for instance would be the case for a research and development
project.5 Instead, in many cases, the completion of an investment project might depend on the
provision of a discrete input produced by an upstream rm. For instance, Billette de Villemeur
et al. (2014) refer to investments in the vaccine industry where facilities are specically designed
for the production of a novel vaccine. In this case, the needed customized equipment is sourced
on an intermediate market from specialized input providers with market power. In the same
vein, Pennings (2016) refers to large infrastructure projects as, e.g., a telecommunications
network. In that case, an upstream rm (construction company) is responsible for the provision
of an indispensable input (network), to a downstream rm (internet provider). In these cases,
the investment cost is endogenous since it is specied by the vertical relationship between the
external input supplier and the project manager who is making the investment decision on
2According to Quinn (2000), using partnerships companies have lowered innovation costs and risks by 60%
to 90%, while similarly decreasing cycle time and leveraging their internal investments by tens to hundreds of
times.
3For instance, a window on new technologies.
4See e.g. Vrande and Vanhaverbeke (2013), Dushnitsky and Lenox (2005a) and Reuer and Tong (2007).
5See also Hargadon and Sutton (2000) and Linder (2004).
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behalf of the project originator.
Keeping all this in mind, the research question that is posed and addressed in the rst paper
of the thesis is: How vertical relationships and external funding a¤ect investment e¢ ciency and
timing?
In the second paper of the thesis, and still working in a supply chain setting, I examine
an investment project undertaken in a decentralized setting in the presence of information
asymmetries.
By construction, the standard real options model does not account for agency conicts
and information asymmetries since the investment is always assumed to be managed by the
project originator. However, in many modern corporations, investment decisions are delegated
by the owner of the corporation (principal) to a manager (agent) who possesses a relevant
skill set or piece of information.6 Of course the principal benets from the expertise of the
agent but, at the same time, s/he might be exposed to information asymmetries. If the agent
has an informational advantage over the principal, then the latter must carefully consider the
underlying means and motives when deciding the terms of the delegation. More precisely, the
principal needs to develop an appropriate mechanism in order to incentivize the agent to share
private information resolving the information asymmetry. The use of such a mechanism is
costly for the principal but, without it, s/he is due to face further distortions stemming from
the coordination failure.7
As we will see in the next section, there is a growing body of papers that incorporate agency
conicts that stem from information asymmetries into the real options model. In spite of the
di¤erences in their analyses, what these papers share is the assumption that the investment cost
is exogenous. The novelty of my work lies again on the fact that the investment cost is explicitly
assumed to be endogenous. With Billette de Villemeur et al. (2014) as my starting point, I
examine an investment project that: i) is characterized by uncertainty and irreversibility, ii) is
undertaken in a decentralized setting and iii) depends on the provision of a necessary input by
an external supplier with market power. Consequently, the research question that is posed and
6Delegation is a standard practice especially in industries that have to do with textiles, construction, aeronau-
tics, telecommunications, computers, automobiles and electronics. Melumad et al. (1997), Agrell et al. (2004),
Lee et al. (2004), Schieg (2008), Tang et al. (2009), Deshpande et al. (2011), Doorey (2011), Kayis et al. (2013),
Bolandifar et al. (2016) and Agrell and Bogetoft (2017) provide relevant examples.
7For an overview of the literature on asymmetric information see e.g. La¤ont and Martimort (2002).
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addressed in the second paper in the thesis is: How vertical relationships and agency conicts
a¤ect investment e¢ ciency and timing?
Last, in the third paper of the thesis and using again the real options approach, I examine
a land allocation problem.
The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is one of the oldest and more dynamic policies
of the European Union (EU). It was launched in 1962 in order to guarantee food security for
the consumers and market stabilization for the farmers in the EU. Since then, the CAP has
changed radically. The 1992 reform, the Agenda 2000 and especially the 2003 reform attempted
to improve the competitiveness of the European farming sector ensuring at the same time budget
control and rural development.8 As of today, the CAP has two main components: Pillar 1, that
deals with payments to farmers and Pillar 2, used by the Member States in order to fund rural
development programs.
Prior to the 2003 CAP reform, farmers received, through Pillar 1, payments which were
coupled to crop production. This measure was deemed as successful during the early years
of the CAP since it e¤ectively secured the food autonomy of the EU. However, this scheme
eventually led, by directly a¤ecting cropping decisions at the farm level, to overproduction.9
In an attempt to make the farming sector more e¢ cient and more market oriented, the CAP
budget devoted to coupled support has been limiting over the years. The introduction of the
Single Payment Scheme (SPS) in 2003 was a relevant step in that direction.
As of today,10 the actual production of agricultural commodities is not a prerequisite for
the CAP income support.11 On the contrary, landholders are entitled to income support as
long as their land meets the so called cross-compliance requirements that include i) statutory
management requirements (SMR) and, ii) Good Agricultural and Environmental Condition
8For a detailed description of the mission and the historical development of the CAP the reader may refer to
http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/cap-history/index_en.htm.
9See e.g. http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/cap-history/index_en.htm.
10The 2013 reform of the Common Agricultural Policy replaced the SPS with the Basic Pay-
ment Scheme (BPS) which came into e¤ect as from 2015. Similarly as the SPS, the BPS
is based on payment entitlements, activated on eligible land and decoupled from production.
See e.g. https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/sites/agriculture/les/direct-support/direct-payments/docs/basic-
payment-scheme_en.pdf.
11Despite the fact that the CAP budget devoted to coupled support is limited, EU member states may
still adopt coupled payments in order to support potentially vulnerable farming sectors. See for instance
https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/sites/agriculture/les/policy-perspectives/policy-briefs/05_en.pdf, page 7.
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(GAEC) standards relating to climate change, good agricultural condition of the land, plant
health and animal welfare.12 The main argument in favor of the decoupling of the CAP income
support from the production of agricultural commodities is that the CAP should support the
income of the farmer, rather than the production itself (see e.g. Keenleyside and Tucker, 2010).
At the same time, according to the CAP,13 a modern rural development policy needs farmers
to act both as producers of food and as guardians of the countryside, undertaking sustainable
farming practices that contribute to the preservation of the natural environment.
The merits of decoupling and its actual impact in the farming industry are however strongly
debated. Decoupling is often seen as a measure that supports passive farming, i.e. the mere
management of the farmland in order to meet the SMR and GAEC obligations but without
producing commodities.14 Passively farmed land is usually referred to as being underutilized or
blocked since it could otherwise be used for producing commodities by expansion-willing farmers
(LRF, 2009 and Ciaian et al., 2010).15 Furthermore, as reported by Brady et al. (2009) and
Ciaian et al. (2010), decoupled payments may, by discouraging farm exit and increasing part-
time farming, slow down structural change in the industry. Last, according to Renwick et al.
(2013), passive farming may hinder agricultural development and consequently even jeopardize
food security.
Consequently, the research question that is posed and addressed in the third chapter of
the thesis is: How are the decoupled from production payments of the current CAP a¤ecting
the timing, the capital intensity and the value of investment projects undertaken by potential
farmers in the EU?
12See Ciaian et al. (2010) for an illustration and discussion of cross-compliance requirements.
13See e.g. https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/sites/agriculture/les/direct-support/direct-
payments/docs/direct-payments-schemes_en.pdf and http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/50-years-of-
cap/les/history/history_book_lr_en.pdf.
14According to Trubins (2013), in some (primarily marginal) regions of the EU, 20-30% of the land is managed
passively.
15The debate is particularly strong in Sweden where the Federation of Swedish Farmers has taken a clear
position against passive farming. Concerns about the impact of passive farming on the land rental market have
also been expressed by the Swedish Agricultural Leaseholders Association, the Dairy Association and the Swedish
Bioenergy Association (see e.g. Björnsson, 2011; Trubins, 2013; Brady et al., 2017).
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Chapter 2
Literature review
2.1 Literature review for paper 1
The work in paper 1 relies on an established body of papers that integrate two research streams:
the basic theory of irreversible investment under uncertainty as in Dixit and Pindyck (1994),
and the classic presentation of vertical relationships as described e.g. by Tirole (1988).1 Real
option analysis has been used to study joint ventures (Kogut, 1991; Li et al., 2008; Cvitani´c et
al., 2011; Banerjee et al., 2014), R&D and technology development (McGrath and Nerkar, 2004;
McGrath, 1997; Folta, 1998), outsourcing (Alvarez and Stenbacka, 2007; Kogut and Kulatilaka,
1994; Moretto and Rossini, 2012; Di Corato et al., 2017; Triantis and Hodder, 1990; Teixeira,
2014), as well as venture capital investments (Lukas et al., 2016; Vrande and Vanhaverbeke,
2013; Dushnitsky and Lenox, 2005b) and acquisitions (Folta and Miller, 2002; Benson and
Ziedonis, 2009; Lambrecht, 2004; Tong and Li, 2011).
The most closely related work I have identied is in corporate nance and supply chain
management, most notably Lambrecht (2004), Banerjee et al. (2014) and Chen (2012), Lukas
and Welling (2014).
Lambrecht (2004) analyzes a merger between two rms motivated by economies of scale using
two di¤erent sequences of moves. According to the rst ("friendly merger"), one of the two
parties is choosing the optimal timing and then the terms of the merger are commonly decided,
1Recent overviews of the related literature include Chevalier-Roignant et al., 2011; Azevedo and Paxson, 2014;
Guimarães Dias and Teixeira, 2010; Huisman et al., 2004.
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whereas, according to the second ("hostile takeover"), the two parties commit to the terms of
the merger rst and the timing is decided second. A comparison between the two suggests that,
the way synergies are divided may inuence the timing of the merger. Similarly, Banerjee et al.
(2014) use a two-stage decision-making framework in which the parties determine the sharing
rule as an outcome of Nash bargaining and one of them makes the timing decision related to the
exercise of the jointly held option. Considering both cash transfers and ownership stakes, they
show that when the exercise decision is made rst, timing is always optimal2 whereas, when
the sharing rule is determined rst ("hostile takeover" case from Lambrecht, 2004) investment
timing is socially ine¢ cient unless a combination of stake in the project and a cash transfer
is used. In this case, it generally matters which rm makes the timing decision and how the
bargaining power is distributed.
In the supply chain management literature, Chen (2012) models a two-echelon supply chain
consisting of one supplier and one retailer. The two-stage optimization problem evolves in the
following way. In the rst stage, the two agents negotiate over the optimal quantities whereas
in the second stage, they coordinately determine the optimal timing of investing in the supply
chain under uncertain demand. The results show that the volatility of demand shock has
an ambiguous e¤ect on the investment threshold with increasing impacts at lower level and
decreasing impacts at higher level of uncertainty. Lastly, Lukas and Welling (2014) model the
optimal timing of "climate-friendly" investments in a supply chain framework and enrich the
contribution of Chen (2012) in the following ways. Firstly, they adopt a non-cooperative game
theoretic setting according to which the optimal timing is decided, not jointly but by one of the
participating rms and, secondly, they extend the two-echelon supply chain allowing for more
than two participants showing that a supply chain becomes less e¢ cient with every additional
link as the timing distortion builds up.
In spite of the di¤erences in their analyses, what all these papers have in common is the
nature of the investment cost which is tacitly assumed to be exogenous. As Billette de Villemeur
et al. (2014) point out, this assumption seems reasonable when the investment is performed
largely in-house, but this is not always the case. For instance, there are many other cases in
2This is a generalization of the friendly merger case discussed in Lambrecht (2004) and in Morellec and
Zhdanov (2005).
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which the completion of a rms investment project depends on an upstream supplier who is
responsible for the provision of a discrete input. In that case, the cost of the single rms
investment is endogenous since it is specied by the vertical relationship between the external
supplier and the potential investor.
The novelty of my work lies on the fact that the investment cost is explicitly assumed to
be endogenous, hence the research question: How vertical relationships and external funding
a¤ect investment e¢ ciency and timing? In the paper, I initially study a non-cooperative game-
theoretic setting according to which, the optimal timing is decided by the investment partner
whereas the sharing rule is decided by the project originator, given the price of an indispensable
input provided by an external supplier with market power. I subsequently readdress this three-
agent3 problem deriving the conditions under which it would be socially preferable to determine
the sharing rule as an outcome of Nash bargaining and I nd that the presence of the upstream
rm makes a substantial di¤erence when one considers the timing and the value of the option
to invest in a given project, both in the cooperative (Nash bargaining solution) and in the
non-cooperative case.
2.2 Literature review for paper 2
My work in paper 2 contributes to the research area that integrates the basic theory of irre-
versible investment under uncertainty as in Dixit and Pindyck (1994) and the literature on
asymmetric information as in La¤ont and Martimort (2002).
There is a growing body of papers that incorporate agency conicts that stem from infor-
mation asymmetries into the real options model. For instance, Grenadier and Wang (2005)
analyze the timing and e¢ ciency of an investment undertaken in a decentralized setting un-
der the presence of information asymmetries and hidden action between the project originator
and the project manager. Shibata (2009) extends the analysis of Grenadier and Wang (2005)
3Note that this framework involves three agents of di¤erent type: the project originator, the investment
partner and the input supplier. It is true that models with more than two agents have already been analyzed
in the literature. For instance, Billette de Villemeur et al. (2014) present the case of a downstream duopoly
with an upstream supplier and Banerjee et al. (2014) extend their two-party model to any number of investment
partners. However, in both cases, as well as in the N-echelon supply chain presented by Lukas and Welling (2014),
the types of agents are always two. The introduction of a third type is the key originality of this framework.
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replacing the originally used bonus-incentive mechanism with an audit technology. Shibata
(2008) focuses on the impact of uncertainty on the timing and the value of the project whereas
Shibata and Nishihara (2010), Grenadier and Malenko (2011), Morellec and Schürho¤ (2011),
Hori and Osano (2014) and Cardoso and Pereira (2015) among others examine the e¤ect of cap-
ital structure and nancing of the investment. Cong (2013) and Bouvard (2014) examine the
implications of endogenous learning and experimentation respectively, whereas Mæland (2010)
and Koskinen and Mæland (2016) approach the agency conict assuming that the project man-
ager is actually the winner of an auction in which a number of experts (potential delegates)
participate. Last, Broer and Zwart (2013) examine the optimal regulation of an investment
undertaken by a monopolist who has private information on the investment cost whereas Arve
and Zwart (2014) examine the case where the information asymmetry between the delegator-
entrepreneur and the delegate-expert has to do with the starting point of the process that is
used to capture the uctuations of the stochastic parameter.
The most closely related papers I have identied are Grenadier and Wang (2005), Shibata
(2009) and the rst paper of the present thesis. Grenadier and Wang (2005) examine the
interaction between a potential investor who contemplates an investment decision characterized
by uncertainty and irreversibility and the expert who is delegated to make the investment
decision on behalf of the potential investor. It is shown that under hidden action and hidden
information between the two parties, the principal can induce the agent both to extend e¤ort
and to reveal private information by using a bonus-incentive contract. Despite the fact that the
use of such an instrument is suboptimal in the sense that the chosen investment timing di¤ers
signicantly from the timing in the full information setting, the principals losses are reduced
since further distortions are avoided.4 Shibata (2009) extends the model presented by Grenadier
and Wang by replacing the bonus-incentive contract with an audit technology. Focusing on the
adverse-selection-only case he shows that, by using auditing instead of a bonus-incentive, the
timing ine¢ ciency is reduced, the principals value is appreciated whereas the agents value is
4 In Grenadier and Wang (2005) the management e¤ort is assumed to be exogenous. Shibata and Nishihara
(2011) approach the same problem using a two-stage optimization problem that allows investment timing and
management e¤ort endogenously decided. The numerical examples that they present suggest that the manage-
ment e¤ort is greater under asymmetric information than under full information. This in turn implies that there
are trade-o¤s between investment e¢ ciency and management e¤ort under asymmetric information. In the same
vein, Hori and Osano (2009) examine the replacement timing of a manager as an incentive mechanism.
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depreciated. Nevertheless, the audit technology does not necessarily lead to an increase in the
aggregate value of the opportunity to invest.
Despite the di¤erences detected in the adopted framework, what the two papers have in
common is the assumption that the investment cost is exogenous. However, as highlighted by
Billette de Villemeur et al. (2014), the cost of an irreversible investment project characterized
by uncertainty does not always reect the projects economic fundamentals. Using a stochastic
dynamic programming model the authors show that, if the completion of an investment project
depends on the provision of an indispensable input from an outside rm, a vertical distortion
arises. This eventually leads to the suboptimal delay of the investment which is also translated
into a reduced value for the project originator.
The analysis presented in the rst paper of the present thesis applies the endogenous pricing
of the input à la Billette de Villemeur et al. (2014) in a setting that describes an investment
project the completion of which depends on the successful interaction between the project
originator and a foreign rm. The foreign rm is assumed to be an investment partner willing
to undertake an exogenously given share of the sunk investment cost claiming a share of the
project in return. The derived results suggest that the presence of an upstream supplier that
is responsible for the provision of an indispensable input causes the suboptimal postponement
of the investment which is then reected in a lower project value. Of course, the fact that the
involved foreign rm acts as an investment partner (and not as a project manager) is important
since it implies that there is no information asymmetry to foster an agency conict downstream.
Consequently, the presence of the external input supplier a¤ects the timing of the investment
and the payo¤s of the two partners but not their interaction itself.
Extending that piece of work, I now study the case where the foreign rm is not an in-
vestment partner but, instead, an expert delegated by the project originator to exercise the
investment option on her/his behalf. The key originality of this framework is exactly the com-
bination of the decentralized investment setting and the endogenous pricing of a necessary input.
I approach the principals investment problem assuming that, under information asymmetries,
s/he uses a bonus-incentive mechanism to guarantee that the project manager will truthfully
share private information related to the cost of the investment. Given this, the upstream sup-
plier who has (full or partial) information about the structure of the downstream industry and
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the evolution of the stochastic process that captures the uctuations of the value of the project
over time, chooses the price of the necessary input. The relevant research question is: How
vertical relationships and agency conicts a¤ect investment e¢ ciency and timing?
2.3 Literature review for paper 3
In terms of methodology, the most closely related literature stream that I have identied is the
one that is comprised by papers that are focusing on the impact of subsidies on investment
projects characterized by uncertainty and irreversibility (see e.g. Pennings, 2000). The papers
in this strand of the literature analyze how the policy maker can use the subsidy as a policy
instrument to induce a certain action. For instance, Thorsen (1999) presents the case where
a subsidy is paid to incentivize the a¤orestation of degraded land and Song et al. (2011)
and Mussho¤ (2012) analyze the use of subsidies as a measure to encourage the cultivation
of energy crops. Similarly, Kumino¤ and Wossink (2010) use it to model the transition from
conventional to organic farming whereas Schatzki (2003) and Isik and Yang (2004) model habitat
conservation. As expected, the policy maker can, by choosing the level of the subsidy, a¤ect
the timing of the transition from the old to the new state.
Despite the fact that the e¤ects of the CAP on the investment behavior of the European
farmers and landholders have been well discussed in political and academic circles since the
implementation of the policy back in the early 1960s, the phenomenon of passive farming
itself has attracted up to now limited attention. Trubins (2013) was the rst to describe the
phenomenon and its characteristics focusing on the e¤ect of the policy on land use in Sweden.
In the same vein, Brady et al. (2017), using a static and deterministic framework, show that
passive farming occurs generally when active farmers do not meet landownersminimal rental
price who eventually prefer to manage their land passively, cashing the decoupled payments.
Building on this work, Di Corato and Brady (2017) study the e¤ect of decoupled payments
on i) the timing and the value of the opportunity to invest in land development and ii) the
lease bargaining process under uncertain farming returns. Solving a dynamic problem, they
show that decoupled payments accelerate the timing of land development if compared to the
case where this support is not provided. Secondly, they verify that, because of the presence
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of decoupled payments, the agreement between a lessee and a landowner is conditional on
the farming project reaching a minimum of expected protability and, last, they show that
cooperative bargaining makes both parties better-o¤.
In this paper, I investigate the impact that the decoupled payments may have on i) the level
of optimal capital intensity, ii) the timing of the investment and iii) the value of the opportunity
to invest, hence the research question: How are the decoupled from production payments of the
current CAP a¤ecting the timing, the capital intensity and the value of investment projects
undertaken by potential farmers in the EU?
As in Di Corato and Brady (2017), I use the real options approach. This is an appropriate
method to use since land development projects involve sunk costs (e.g. the mere transformation
of idle land into farmland), uncertainty of future payo¤s (e.g. the prices of agricultural com-
modities are volatile) and exibility (e.g. the option to postpone the investment or the option to
switch between active and passive farming according to the market trends once the investment
is undertaken).5 My contribution lies on the fact that I relate the temporal exibility available
before the investment is undertaken, i.e. the option to invest, with the operational exibility
available once invested, i.e. the option to suspend and the option to restart farming.
5See also Feil et al. (2013).
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Chapter 3
Synthesis of paper 1
In this paper, I use the real options approach in order to examine the interaction among i) a rm
who is contemplating entering an uncertain new market, ii) a rm who acts like an investment
partner partly nancing this project receiving a share of the nal investment in return and iii)
an upstream supplier with market power who is responsible for the provision of an input that
is necessary for the investment to take place. Using a stochastic dynamic programming model,
I examine how the involvement of the two alien agents a¤ects the investment timing and how
the observed timing discrepancies are reected in the value of the opportunity to invest.
3.1 The model
3.1.1 The basic set-up
Firm A is a risk neutral potential investor willing to enter a market with growing but uncertain
demand. The prot ow that A is cashing upon investment is ytM where M > 0 is the
instantaneous monopolistic prot per unit of yt and yt is a stochastic scale parameter that
uctuates according to the following geometric Brownian motion:
dyt
yt
= dt+ dWt, y0 = y, (1)
where  > 0 is the drift,  > 0 is the instantaneous volatility and dWt is the standard increment
of a Wiener process (standard Brownian motion) uncorrelated over time satisfying E [dWt] = 0
22
and E

dW 2t

= dt.
A discrete input is a prerequisite for A to operate in the nal market and this input is
supplied by a risk neutral upstream rm with market power called C. It is assumed that C
prices this input taking into consideration the structural parameters of the geometric Brownian
motion presented above, but without ever observing yt.1
The completion of the project depends also on the cooperation of a risk neutral investment
partner B who is willing to bear a share of the investment cost, asking for compensation in
return. Contrary to the upstream rm, it is assumed that the investment partner is in a position
to continuously and veriably observe the uctuations of the scale parameter over time. One
can argue that this is a sensible assumption since B will consider joining forces with A only if
s/he has enough information for the considered project. For instance, one can think of B as a
nancial institution and A as a customer asking for a business loan. The customer will need
to present a thorough business plan in order to convince the nancial institution about the
promising character of the project. In this case, the potential investor is basically voluntarily
sharing her/his information endowment with the investment partner. Alternatively, one can
assume that B might actually be in a position to observe the scale parameter over time without
As help. For instance, Mulherin and Boone (2000) as well as Vrande and Vanhaverbeke (2013)
report evidence for signicant industry clustering for merger and acquisition activities. These
ndings support the argumentation from Puranam et al. (2009) and Dushnitsky and Lenox
(2005b) who suggest that rms seem to seek ventures similar to their own because this appears
to facilitate the possible integration of technological resources in the future.
Before analyzing the three-agent case where the interaction among A, B and C is discussed,
I briey review the problem under (i) vertical integration and (ii) outsourcing or partial external
funding (but not both).
3.1.2 Vertical Integration
The vertically integrated case will be the benchmark. In this simplied setting it is assumed
that the potential investor produces the input in-house funding privately the completion of the
1As noted by Billette de Villemeur et al. (2014), if C is in a position to continuously and veriably observe
the state of yt, then s/he can expropriate the project by choosing a suitable input price. Here I assume that the
upstream rm has no access to this kind of information.
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project.
Following the real options literature, one should keep in mind that there is some exibility
when one considers an investment opportunity under irreversibility and uncertainty. As rstly
reported by McDonald and Siegel (1986), the ability to delay an irreversible investment expen-
diture is an important source of exibility that profoundly a¤ects the decision to invest. A will
only invest when the projects expected payo¤ exceeds the cost of the investment by the option
value of further postponing the investment into the future.2
Assuming that the initial market size is positive and su¢ ciently small so that a delay of the
investment is preferable, the optimal investment time point V I is derived through the solution
of the following maximization problem:
F V IA (y) = max
V I
Ey

(VV I   I)e r
V I

= max
yV I

yV IM
r      I

y
yV I

; (2)
where Vt = Et
R1
t ysMe
 r(s t)ds

= ytMr  is the value of the project,   12   2 +q 

2
  12
2
+ 2r
2
> 1 is the positive root of the characteristic equation 12
2( 1)+ r = 0,
r (> ) is the common to all rms discount rate,3 I > 0 is the sunk cost of producing the input
in-house and V I = inf

t  0 yt = yV I 	 is the random rst time point that yt hits the barrier
yV I which is the market size that triggers the investment. The expressions for F V IA (y) and 
are standard in the real options literature (see Dixit and Pindyck (1994), Chapters 5-6 and
Dixit (1993), Section 2). From the rst-order condition one obtains
yV I =

   1
r   
M
I: (3)
As expected, yV I is increasing in the sunk investment cost I and the volatility  but is decreasing
in the present value of the prot ow Mr  .
4 In words, a rm stands to gain more by holding,
rather than exercising, an investment option with a high strike price (I in this case), a high
underlying asset volatility ( in this case) but small return ( Mr  in this case).
5
2OBrien et al. (2003) present strong empirical evidence in favor of this argument. More precisely, they nd
that entrepreneurs account for the value of the option to delay entering a new market when contemplating such
a decision.
3The inequality r >  guarantees convergence.
4Note that the e¤ect of volatility on the investment threshold passes through .
5Note that the classic net present value rule would dictate the lower investment threshold yNPV = r 
M
I. As
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Combining Eq. (2) with Eq. (3) we obtain the value of the option to invest
F V IA (y) =
I
   1

y
yV I

: (4)
These results lead to the rst proposition:
Proposition 1 A single rm that produces the input in-house and self-nances the investment
project, will enter the market as soon as the scale parameter reaches a threshold yV I =  1
r 
M
I.
The value of the option to invest in this project is F V IA (y) =
I
 1

y
yV I

.
3.1.3 The input is outsourced and the investment is privately funded
Suppose now that the input is produced by an upstream rm with market power C. Adopting
the framework presented by Billette de Villemeur et al. (2014), A and C engage in a leader-
follower game at time zero. Moving backwards, A (the follower) decides the optimal investment
threshold taking into consideration the constant input price p. Then, C (the leader) decides
the optimal p accounting for the production cost I, the structural parameters of the stochastic
term yt and As timing decision.
The optimal investment threshold is derived through the solution of the following maxi-
mization problem:
FOSA (y) = max
yOS(p)

yOS(p)M
r      p

y
yOS(p)

(5)
Solving we obtain
yOS(p) =

   1
r   
M
p: (6)
The decision problem of C, involves only the choice of p that is derived as the solution of
FOSC (y) = max
pOS
 
pOS   I  y
yOS(pOS)

:
pOS =

   1I: (7)
Combining the optimal investment trigger from Eq. (6) with the optimal input price from Eq.
one can see, even a risk neutral potential investor is sensitive to uncertainty when considering an irreversible
investment the realization of which can be postponed.
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(7), we obtain yOS
 
pOS

=  1
r 
M

 1I which can be written as
yOS
 
pOS

=

   1y
V I
 
> yV I

: (8)
From Eq. (7) and Eq. (8) one can see that both pOS and yOS
 
pOS

are decreasing in  i.e.
are increasing in volatility. This implies that A will probably consider abandoning a very risky
project or, in any case, will delay the investment as much as possible.6 C takes this into account
setting a high pOS discounting this way for the delay between the time that pOS is chosen until
the time it is cashed. Similarly, a project that involves very little risk will be undertaken
relatively quickly by A and this will also be reected in a lower input price. Note however, that
there is a minimum for pOS : lim
!0
pOS = rr I > I. As one can see, despite the fact that the
acceleration of the project is benecial for C, s/he is not willing to lower pOS below a minimum
r
r I. This has to do with the fact that, for prices below
r
r I, the completion of the project
is indeed further hastened but what is sacriced in terms of cash ow is not remunerated from
the additional acceleration of the project.
Combining Eq. (5), (7) and (8) we have
FOSA (y) =

   1

 1
F V IA (y): (9)
Also, for C:
FOSC (y) =

   1


F V IA (y) (10)
The following proposition summarizes these ndings:
Proposition 2 A single rm that outsources the input and self-nances the investment project,
will enter the market as soon as the scale parameter reaches a threshold yOS
 
pOS

=  1y
V I .
The value of the option to invest in this project is FOSA (y) =

 1

 1
F V IA (y).
Comparing the ndings from Propositions 1 and 2 we obtain the following:
Proposition 3 When an upstream supplier is responsible for the provision of the input, the
6 lim
!1
yOS
 
pOS
!1
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investment is postponed
 
yOS > yV I

and the potential investors option to invest is less valuable 
FOSA (y) < F
V I
A (y)

.
As one can see, the e¤ect of the presence of C is twofold. On one hand, it increases the
investment threshold delaying the completion of the project and, on the other, it reduces the
value of the option to invest for the potential investor A.
3.1.4 The input is produced in-house and the investment is partly externally
funded
Going back to the case of vertical integration, it is assumed that the potential investor produces
the input in-house. However, the realization of the project that A has in mind depends now on
the cooperation of an investment partner B.
Following Lukas and Welling (2014), B is willing to undertake an exogenously given share
 2 (0; 1) of the sunk investment cost, and this allows A to fund only the rest of the project.
In return, A and B negotiate over the compensation that the former needs to pay to the latter.
More precisely, it is assumed that at time zero A credibly commits to o¤er a fraction  2 (0; 1)
of the project to B. Now B has the option to accept this o¤er immediately disbursing the
capital needed for the realization of the project or, alternatively, can delay this contribution for
some future time.7 Similarly to the previous subsection, we have a leader-follower game with A
(the leader) deciding the compensation o¤er and B (the follower) deciding the optimal timing
taking the compensation o¤er  into account.8
Starting with the problem of the follower we have F V CB (y) = max
yV C( )

 y
V C( )M
r    I

y
yV C( )

.
Solving we obtain
yV C( ) =

 
yV I : (11)
7As one can see, the adopted framework is general enough to describe joint ventures and independent venture
capital investments. However, it seems particularly suitable to describe corporate venture capital (CVC) invest-
ments. According to Roberts and Berry (1985), CVC investments consist of minority equity stakes in relatively
new, not publicly traded companies and their purpose is to identify and value early-stage technology in start-ups.
This description corresponds exactly to the behavior of the investment partner B who agrees to receive a share
 of As project instead of a standard cash ow.
8One can also consider the case where B is the game-leader submitting the compensation o¤er and A is the
game-follower deciding the investment timing. In subsection 3.4.1 of the Appendix, I show that such a change
does not a¤ect the nature of the main results.
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As expected, yV C( ) is increasing in  and decreasing in  . This just means that the investment
will be postponed as the cost share for the investment partner is increasing, a result that can
be neutralized if the potential investor is willing to improve the submitted compensation o¤er.
As one can see, A faces a dilemma since a low compensation o¤er implies access to a larger
cash ow later in the future whereas a high compensation o¤er shortens the waiting period but
gives access to a smaller cash ow in return.
The potential investor takes into consideration the reaction of the investment partner and
decides the compensation o¤er that is derived as the solution of the following maximization
problem:
F V CA (y) = max
 V C
 
1   V C yV C( V C)M
r      (1  ) I

y
yV C( V C)

, (12)
which yields
 V C =
 (   1)
   1 +  : (13)
Combining Eq. (11) and Eq. (13) we obtain
yV C( V C) =
   1 + 
   1 y
V I
 
> yV I

: (14)
Studying the optimal compensation o¤er, one can see that  V C is increasing both in  and
in . Focusing on the e¤ect of , it is interesting to see that the maximum optimal o¤er is
always below 100%. This has to do with the fact that a more generous compensation o¤er will
indeed hasten the completion of the project but will only make the potential investor worse-o¤
since what is sacriced in terms of compensation is not remunerated from the acceleration of
the investment.
One can also observe that yV C( V C) is increasing in  and decreasing in . Actually, the
"distance" between yV C( V C) and yV I increases in  despite the fact that, at the same time,
 V C is also increasing in . This happens because yV C( V C) is a linear, whereas  V C is a
concave function of . In words, despite the fact that the compensation o¤er is becoming more
generous as the share of the cost covered by B increases, in real terms the o¤er worsens and
this is reected in a higher investment threshold.
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Last, combining Eq. (12), (13) and (14) we obtain
F V CA (y) =

   1
   1 + 
 1
F V IA (y): (15)
Also, for B we have
F V CB (y) = 

   1
   1 + 

F V IA (y): (16)
The following proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition 4 In the case where the single rm produces the input in-house but the completion
of the project depends on external funding, the investment occurs when the scale parameter
reaches a threshold yV C( V C) =  1+ 1 y
V I . The value of the option to invest in this project is
F V CA (y) =

 1
 1+
 1
F V IA (y).
Comparing these ndings with the values derived in the vertically integrated case we have:
Proposition 5 In the case where the single rm produces the input in-house but the completion
of the project depends on external funding, the investment is delayed
 
yV C > yV I

and the
potential investors option to invest is less valuable
 
F V CA (y) < F
V I
A (y)

.
As in the previous subsection, the e¤ect of the presence of the additional agent is twofold
since, on one hand, it increases the investment threshold delaying the completion of the project
and, on the other, it reduces the value of the option to invest for the potential investor.
3.2 The three-agent case
In this section I combine the analyses presented above and I show how the synchronous presence
of B and C a¤ects the performance and the actions of A as well as the investment threshold.
The three-agent game evolves in the following way:
1. C is the game-leader and decides the input price that maximizes her/his value of the
opportunity to invest.
2. Given the input price and the cost share , A submits the compensation o¤er  to B
and, nally,
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3. B evaluates this compensation o¤er and decides when to accept it, disbursing the amount
that is required for the realization of As project.
Keeping in mind that A and B continuously and veriably observe the magnitude of yt
whereas C only knows the structural parameters of the related stochastic process, we move
backwards and rst study the behavior of the investment partner B. The optimal investment
threshold is derived through the solution of: FB3(y) = max
y3( ;p)

 y3( ;p)Mr    p

y
y3( ;p)

.
Solving, we obtain
y3 ( ; p) =

   1
r   
M
p

 
: (17)
The potential investor A will take into consideration the decision of the investment partner
and will choose the compensation o¤er taking the price of the input as given. The optimal  
is derived as the solution of FA3(y) = max
 3

(1   3) y3( 3;p)Mr    (1  ) p

y
y3( 3;p)

. From
the rst-order condition we have
 3 =
 (   1)
   1 +  : (18)
As one can check, this is exactly the compensation o¤er that we derived in Eq. (13) where C
was absent. Obviously, the presence/absence of C does not a¤ect the magnitude of the optimal
compensation o¤er that A submits to B since the exogenously given cost share  has to do with
the generic investment cost no matter if this is I or p.
Lets conclude with the game-leader C. The input supplier observes the behavior both of A
and of B and optimally decides the price of the input solving FC3(y) = max
p3
(p3   I)

y
y3( 3;p3)

which yields:
p3 =

   1I (19)
Comparing Eq. (19) with Eq. (7), one can see that p3 = pOS which means that the pres-
ence/absence of B does not a¤ect the optimal price of the input that is decided by C. This is
not a surprise since, C is indi¤erent to the means that A uses to fund the project.
Combining Eq. (17), (18) and (19) we derive the investment threshold which, in this case,
is
y3 ( 3; p3) =

   1
   1 + 
   1 y
V I
 
> yV I

: (20)
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Note that y3 ( 3; p3) is decreasing in  and increasing in . Similarly to y
V C( V C), the "dis-
tance" between y3 ( 3; p3) and y
V I increases in  in spite of the simultaneous improvement
of the corresponding compensation o¤er. The reasoning is the same: the investment trigger
is a linear whereas the compensation o¤er is a concave function of the cost share . As we
have seen in the previous subsection, despite the fact that the compensation o¤er is becoming
more generous as the cost share  increases, in real terms the o¤er worsens and actually, in
the three-agent case, this e¤ect is even more dramatic since the compensation o¤er worsens
"faster" as the (positive) slope of y3 with respect to  is larger than the (positive) slope of yV C
with respect to  exactly because of the presence of C.
I conclude this subsection returning to the option values for the three agents. Keeping in
mind the values for y3 ( 3; p3) ; p3 and  3 we obtain
FA3(y) =

   1

 1    1
   1 + 
 1
F V IA (y); (21.1)
FB3(y) = 

   1

 1    1
   1 + 

F V IA (y); (21.2)
FC3(y) =

   1

     1
   1 + 

F V IA (y): (21.3)
The following proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition 6 In the three-agent case where the single rm outsources the production of the
input and the completion of the project depends on external funding, the investment occurs when
the scale parameter reaches a threshold y3 ( 3; p3) =

 1
 1+
 1 y
V I . The value of the option to
invest in this project for the potential investor is FA3(y) =

 1

 1 
 1
 1+
 1
F V IA (y).
Comparing our ndings with the values derived in the vertically integrated case we have:
Proposition 7 In the three agent case the investment takes place ine¢ ciently late
 
y3 ( 3; p3) > y
V I

and this is also reected in the potential investors option value
 
FA3(y) < F
V I
A (y)

.
3.2.1 Discussion
In the previous subsections I focused on the e¤ect that the presence of additional agents has on
the investment threshold and the potential investors option value both for the two-agent and
31
the three-agent case. Keeping all this in mind one can examine this e¤ect in the level of the
industry as a whole.
The input is outsourced and the investment is privately funded: We have already
computed the value of the option to invest for the potential investor A and the input supplier
C. Now adding up Eq. (9) and Eq. (10) we obtain
FOS(y)  FOSA (y) + FOSC (y) =
(   1) 1

(2   1)F V IA (y): (22)
As one can see, the presence of the rm C a¤ects negatively the value of the option to invest
for the whole industry since FOS(y) < F V IA (y).
The input is produced in-house and the investment is partly externally funded:
Summing Eq. (15) and Eq. (16) we obtain
F V C(y)  F V CA (y) + F V CB (y) =
   1 + 
   1

   1
   1 + 

F V IA (y): (23)
The presence of rm B a¤ects negatively the value of the option to invest for the whole industry
since F V C(y) < F V IA (y).
The three-agent case: Summing up the values of the option to invest for A, B and C from
Eq. (21) we obtain
F3(y)  FA3(y) + FB3(y) + FC3(y) (24)
=

   1

 1    1
   1 + 
    1 + 
   1 +  +
   1


F V IA (y):
A comparison of the results derived in this and the previous subsections is given in the following
proposition:
Proposition 8 A comparison among the investment triggers and the option values presented
above gives the following rankings:
1) y3 ( 3; p3) > y
OS(pOS) > yV C( V C) > yV I ,
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2) F3(y) < FOS(y) < F V C(y) < F V IA (y),
3) FA3(y) < FOSA (y) < F
V C
A (y) < F
V I
A (y),
4) FB3(y) < F V CB (y) and
5) FC3(y) < FOSC (y).
A number of interesting results can be derived by these comparisons. First of all, we see
that as the number of agents involved in an investment project increases, the completion of
this project is postponed to the detriment of the investments value both in the rm and in the
industry level. As expected, the vertically integrated case represents the most favorable whereas
the three-agent case represents the least favorable scenario. Another interesting observation has
to do with the comparison between the e¤ect of the presence of the upstream rm C and the
e¤ect of the presence of the investment partner B. As one can see, external funding is preferred
to outsourcing in terms of timing and, consequently, in terms of option value.9
3.2.2 Numerical Examples
I conclude this subsection using some numerical examples that illustrate the e¤ect of outsourcing
and external funding on the investment timing and the value of the option to enter the new
market.
The parameters vary as follows: The drift, , and the volatility, , take values {0.025,
0.035} and {0.2, 0.25, 0.3, 0.35, 0.4} respectively. A high magnitude of the drift captures a
high expected increase in the size of the new market whereas di¤erent levels of volatility are
used to demonstrate the impact of uncertainty on the investment thresholds and option values.
The sunk investment cost I takes values {24, 48} whereas both the initial level of the stochastic
parameter y0 and the instantaneous monopolistic prot per unit of yt, M , are set equal to
unity (y0 = M = 1). I allow for three di¤erent levels of exogenous cost share: 1 = 0:1,
2 = 0:5 and 3 = 0:9 in order to demonstrate how the participation of an investment partner
a¤ects the timing and the performance of the investment project. The interest rate r is initially
9 In subsection 3.4.2 of the Appendix it is shown that the ranking of the investment thresholds and, con-
sequently, the ranking of the aggregate option values, is the same even when A and B swap places i.e. if A
becomes the time-deciding agent (game-follower) and B becomes the one that chooses the compensation share
(game-leader). However, I also show that this is not the case for the ranking of As option values which is actually
sensitive to such a change.
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set equal to 5% but I also check the e¤ect of an increase to 6% which corresponds to a higher
opportunity cost of capital.
In TABLE 1, I use  = 0:025;  = 0:2; r = 0:05; y0 = 1;  = 0:5 and I = 24 and I obtain
the values that serve as the standard of comparison. As one can check, TABLE 1 demonstrates
how the investment threshold and the value of the opportunity to invest in a given project are
a¤ected by the presence of an investment partner and/or the presence of an upstream rm. In
accordance to Proposition 8, we see that the presence of any alien agent causes the postponement
of the investment. The investment threshold is, roughly, doubled when an investment partner
is involved, and tripled when a necessary input is outsourced. However, the combined e¤ect is
more dramatic since, under both outsourcing and external funding, the investment threshold is
more than six times higher than the investment threshold under vertical integration.
As for the project value itself, we see that the changes in the investment threshold are also
reected in the value of the option to invest. The project depreciates whenever its comple-
tion depends on the contribution of one of the other two parties, with outsourcing being less
preferable than an investment partnership but more preferable than the three-agent case. In-
terestingly, under external funding the investors share of the project is equal to 71% of her/his
share under vertical integration whereas, when outsourcing is explicitly taken into consideration
the percentage drops to 42%. Unsurprisingly, a similar e¤ect is observed when one studies the
value of the option to invest in the level of the industry. Arguably, these results underline the
di¤erence that the nature of the investment cost (endogenous or exogenous) can make when an
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investment project characterized by uncertainty and irreversibility is considered.
TABLE 1
Standard of Comparison
Vertical Integration External Funding Outsourcing Three-Agent Case
y 1.90 3.96 6.02 12.55
FA 20.35 14.50 11.96 8.52
FB - 3.48 - 2.04
FC - - 3.77 1.29
F 20.35 17.98 15.73 11.85
In TABLE 2, I examine the e¤ect that a change in the cost I has on the investment thresholds
and the option values presented above. For I = 48, i.e. for an investment cost two times higher
than the standard of comparison, all the investment thresholds are doubled in magnitude and
all the option values drop to, about, 73% of their corresponding values given in TABLE 1.
Starting with the investment thresholds, it is evident that a potential investor will have less
rush to invest in a, other things equal, more expensive project. As for the depreciation of
the option values, one can argue that two opposing forces drive this result. On one hand, the
value of the option to delay a costly and irreversible investment is valuable, and this value
is expected to increase in I since, the more expensive the investment, the more valuable the
option to postpone it. On the other hand however, the higher investment threshold implies a
further delay of the investment which eventually distances the anticipated cash ow further in
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the future. As one can see, the second force prevails.
TABLE 2
The E¤ect of a Change in the Investment Cost on Timing and Option Value
I = 48
Vert. Integ. Ext. Funding Outsourcing Three-Agent Case
y=yT1 2 2 2 2
FA=F
T1
A 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73
FB=F
T1
B - 0.73 - 0.73
FC=F
T1
C - - 0.73 0.73
F=F T1 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73
In TABLE 3, I study the e¤ect that changes in the drift, , may have. A comparison of
the option values of TABLE 3 with the ones derived in TABLE 1 shows that an increase in the
expected growth rate from  = 0:025 to  = 0:035, is benecial both in the rm and in the
industry level. However, the e¤ect of such a change in the investment triggers is not as obvious.
Actually, we observe that a higher  is, ceteris paribus, encouraging the acceleration of a project
under vertical integration but is causing the further postponement of projects the completion of
which is conditional on the participation of a second or a third party. Especially, in the three-
agent case, we see that a  = 0:01 is enough to (more than) double the related investment
threshold. The intuition behind this result has to do exactly with the absence or the presence
of the alien rms. When the potential investor acts unilaterally, a positive change in  signals
the shortening of the expected waiting period until the right time for the investment to take
place has come. This, of course, is reected in a lower investment threshold.10 Nevertheless,
under the presence of an upstream supplier and/or an investment partner, the situation is quite
di¤erent. The upstream rm updates the price of the input asking a higher price whereas the
compensation o¤er that the investment partner receives is now readjusted for the higher .
10As we can see from Eq. (3), this is actually the e¤ect of two opposing forces. On one hand, a higher a implies
a higher present value for the prot ow

M
r 

which, in return, favors the acceleration of the investment. On
the other hand however, an increased drift implies a lower 
 1 which is the factor that corrects the investment
threshold for uncertainty and irreversibility. Apparently, under vertical integration, the rst force prevails.
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Eventually, the time-deciding agent accounts for these changes choosing a higher, instead of
lower, investment threshold.
TABLE 3
The E¤ect of a Change in the Drift on Timing and Option Value
 = 0:035
Vert. Integ. Ext. Funding Outsourcing Three-Agent Case
y 1.80 5.40 9 27
FA 46.04 34.98 30.79 23.39
FB - 5.83 - 3.89
FC - - 6.15 1.55
F 46.04 40.81 36.94 28.83
As for the volatility , in Figure 1 and Figure 2 we see how an increase in  from  =
0:2 to  = 0:4 a¤ects the timing and the value of the option to invest in the project under
consideration. As expected, all the investment thresholds are increasing in . As is standard in
the real options literature, the presence of uncertainty and irreversibility calls for a more careful
investment policy. Hence, investment projects should occur at higher return levels, a decision
which in turn requires waiting longer before investing. Note however that higher investment
thresholds do not cause the depreciation of the value of the corresponding project. On the
contrary, a higher volatility is, as anticipated, increasing the value of the option to delay the
completion of an investment project characterized by uncertainty and irreversibility.
What is interesting to see here is that the investment threshold in the three-agent case is
signicantly more sensitive to an increase in volatility with respect to the other three investment
scenarios, a result which is also reected in a proportionately higher option value. As before,
the intuition here is that the investment threshold under both outsourcing and external funding
is a¤ected both by the decisions of the project originator and by the actions of the investment
partner and the upstream rm which are also a¤ected by changes in . For instance, we know
that the upstream rm anticipates that an increase in  will further delay the completion of
the investment project. This foresight calls for the decision of a higher input price that will
37
act as compensation against this (further) delayed cash ow. Similarly, the project originator
also anticipates a (further) postponement in the completion of the project and, using analogous
reasoning, decides to decrease the submitted compensation o¤er. Finally, the time-deciding in-
vestment partner observes the increase in  as well as the updated input price and compensation
o¤er and chooses an appropriately high investment threshold that accounts for all this.
FIGURE 1
The E¤ect of a Change in Volatility on the Investment Threshold
FIGURE 2
The E¤ect of a Change in Volatility on the Option Value
In TABLE 4, I focus on the impact that a change in the exogenous investment cost share
 may have. The benchmark value that I choose is  = 0:5 which implies a perfectly balanced
investment scheme with both partners undertaking equal portions of the sunk cost. I subse-
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quently allow both for high ( = 0:9) and for low ( = 0:1) investment cost shares and I also
present, for comparisons sake, the case where there is no partnership ( = 0). Starting with the
investment thresholds, one notices that a higher involvement of an investment partner always
implies the postponement of the project. Of course, keeping in mind the analysis of subsection
3.1.4 and subsection 3.2.1, this is hardly a surprise. As we have already seen there, a higher cost
share  implies a higher nominal, but lower real, compensation o¤er from the project originator
to the investment partner. Eventually, this is reected in a higher investment threshold and
the further postponement of the investment (in expected terms).
The e¤ect of a change in  on the option values of the three parties is nothing but an
extension of the e¤ect that we observe in the investment triggers. A higher  causes the
depreciation of the value of the opportunity to invest for every party apart from the investment
partner who is favored by such a change. This adverse e¤ect is also clearly reected in the value
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of the investment opportunity of the industry as a whole.
TABLE 4
The E¤ect of a Change in the Exogenous Cost Share on Timing and Option Value
 = 0  = 0:1
Ext. Funding Three-Agent Case Ext. Funding Three-Agent Case
y 1.90 6.02 2.31 7.33
FA 20.35 11.96 18.60 10.92
FB 0 0 1.53 0.90
FC - 3.77 - 2.83
F 20.35 15.73 20.13 14.65
 = 0:5  = 0:9
Ext. Funding Three-Agent Case Ext. Funding Three-Agent Case
y 3.97 12.56 5.61 17.79
FA 14.50 8.52 12.35 7.26
FB 3.48 2.04 3.77 2.21
FC - 1.29 - 0.78
F 17.98 11.85 16.12 10.25
Last, in TABLE 5, I examine the e¤ect of a change in the interest rate r. Lets start with
the vertically integrated case. As far as the investment threshold is concerned, two opposing
forces are acting. On one hand, an increase in r makes the potential investor more impatient
since, with a higher interest rate, the present becomes relatively more important than the future
which implies the selection of a lower investment threshold. At the same time however, the
increase in r implies a decrease in the present value of the prot ow that the project is meant
to generate once it takes place. This limits the interest of the potential investor to invest right
now in a project which does not cover the high opportunity cost of capital. As we see in TABLE
5, the second force prevails causing the postponement of the investment.
In the case where we deal with an investment partnership, an increase in the interest rate
from 0.05 to 0.06 causes a similar e¤ect but of smaller magnitude. The analysis of the previous
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paragraph holds here as well. However, one needs to take into account the fact that the
investment trigger is now also a¤ected by the change in the compensation o¤er that is submitted
to the time-deciding agent. The project originator, being impatient her/himself, is willing to
make a more generous compensation o¤er in an attempt to shorten the waiting period till the
completion of the project. As one can see, this makes a di¤erence almost neutralizing the
increase in r.
The most interesting cases involve the participation of the upstream rm. Despite the fact
that the argumentation from above still applies, the presence of an impatient upstream rm
causes, as one can see in TABLE 5, the acceleration of the investment. In order to understand
the intuition behind this result, one should keep in mind that the e¤ect of a change in r is
di¤erent for the upstream rm than it is for the two investment partners. It is true that all
the involved rms discount the value of the option to invest with a common discount factor.11
However, the way that each agent evaluates the net present value of the project at the delivery
date is di¤erent. For the two investment partners, the completion of the investment project
signals the commencing of a prot ow that needs to be appropriately discounted. Of course,
a change in r a¤ects the chosen discount factor. On the contrary, when the delivery date is
reached, the upstream rm receives a lump sum which corresponds to the price of the input
that s/he supplied and which is not a¤ected by changes in r. As a consequence, even a small
increase in the discount rate is enough to make the upstream supplier su¢ ciently impatient and
willing to ask a lower input price as soon as this will lead to the acceleration of the investment.
Indeed, in TABLE 5 we see that, when an upstream rm is present, an increased discount rate
encourages the acceleration of the completion of the project, a result which is most prevalent
in the three-agent case where the impatience of the two alien agents concurs.
As for the value of the option to invest, we see that even a slightly increased interest rate
can considerably reduce the projects option value. As we have already stressed above, an
increased interest rate implies that the present becomes nancially more important than the
future. Hence, the option to delay an investment project for some future time point naturally
11Recall that in subsection 3.1.3 we have

y
yOS(pOS)

both for A and for C, in subsection 3.1.4 we have
y
yV C( V C)

both for A and for B and in subsection 3.2 we have

y
y3( 3;p3)

for all three agents.
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becomes less valuable.
TABLE 5
The E¤ect of a Change in the Interest Rate on Timing and Option Value
r = 0:06
Vert. Integ. Ext. Funding Outsourcing Three-Agent Case
y=yT1 1.16 1.02 0.97 0.84
FA=F
T1
A 0.54 0.52 0.50 0.49
FB=F
T1
B - 0.60 - 0.56
FC=F
T1
C - - 0.60 0.68
F=F T1 0.54 0.54 0.53 0.52
3.3 The compensation as the product of Nash bargaining
In subsection 3.1.4 and in subsection 3.2, I used a non-cooperative setting in order to describe
the interaction between the potential investor A and the investment partner B. However, as
noticed by the extant literature, co-development partnerships are an increasingly utilized way
of improving protability, competitiveness and innovation e¤ectiveness.12 In the following, I re-
approach the potential investors business plan using a cooperative framework. More precisely,
I assume that the compensation o¤er will now be replaced by a Nash bargaining solution that
will explicitly reect the bargaining power of the involved agents. I begin with the two-agent
case and I subsequently allow for outsourcing.
3.3.1 The input is produced in-house and the investment is partly externally
funded
Similarly to the presentation of subsection 3.1.4, I assume that A can produce the input in-
house and that the completion of the project is conditional on the participation of a rm B
who acts like an investment partner. As before, B is willing to undertake a share  of the
sunk investment cost given that s/he will receive compensation in return. What is new here
12See Zhou and Yang (2008), Biehl et al. (2006) and Cvitani´c et al. (2011) respectively.
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with respect to the analysis of subsection 3.1.4 is that, by assumption, A agrees with B on the
compensation share and then decides the optimal investment threshold. Note that, contrary to
the initial analysis, it is now assumed that A, not B, is the time deciding agent. Apparently,
A sacrices her/his exclusivity on the decision of  in order to become the time-deciding agent
and similarly B sacrices her/his position as the time-deciding agent in order to have a say in
the decision of  .13 In the following, we see under what conditions this cooperative framework
can replace the non-cooperative one.
Starting with the maximization problem of the time-deciding agent we have:
FAN (y) = max
yN ( )

(1   ) yN ( )M
r      (1  ) I

y
yN ( )

: (25)
Solving we obtain
yN ( ) =
1  
1   y
V I : (26)
Moving one step back, the two parties bargain anticipating that A will invest as soon as yt
reaches the trigger yN ( ). Given this, the new optimal compensation share is derived as the
solution of
max
 N

 N
yN ( N )M
r      I
B 
(1   N )
yN ( N )M
r      (1  ) I
1 B  y
yN ( N )

, (27)
where B represents Bs bargaining power.
14 Solving we obtain
 N =
 (   1) + B (1  )
    : (28)
Combining Eq. (26) and Eq. (28) we have
yN ( N ) =
   
   B
yV I : (29)
13 In subsections 3.4.1 and 3.4.2 of the Appendix, I show how the analysis presented in subsections 3.1.4 and 3.2
of the main body of the paper changes if A and B swap places. In subsections 3.4.3 and 3.4.4 of the Appendix, I do
the same for the analysis presented in subsection 3.3 where the initial non-cooperative game-theoretic framework
is replaced by a Nash bargaining solution and I show that such a change does not a¤ect the nature of the main
results.
14 It is assumed that the distribution of bargaining power is exogenous and that A+ B = 1 with A  0 and
B  0, where i is the bargaining power of agent i with i 2 fA;Bg.
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One can check that the compensation  N increases linearly in B.
15 It is also true that,
contrary to the compensation o¤ers that we have encountered in the previous subsections,  N is
not always increasing in , hence decreasing in volatility. More precisely, here we have @ N@ ? 0
for  ? B. In words, the compensation o¤er is decreasing in volatility only when the bargaining
power of B is su¢ ciently low. Another interesting point is that when B bears almost the whole
investment cost ( ! 1), we obtain  N ' 1. Contrary to the compensation o¤er  V C that
cannot be larger than  1 ,  N can reach values as high as 100%, irrespective of the magnitude
of , if the cost share of the time-deciding agent A is small enough.
As far as the investment threshold is concerned, one can see that, as expected, yN ( N ) is
increasing in B
16 and that in the special case where B =  we have exactly yN ( N ) = y
V I .
In general, when the bargaining power of B is smaller (larger) than the exogenously given ,
the investment takes place ine¢ ciently early (late). Finally, one can check that
@
yN ( N )
yV I
@ ? 0 for
 ? B which means that when the bargaining power of B is su¢ ciently low (high), an increase
in volatility results in a lower (higher) investment threshold yN ( N ) relative to y
V I .
Given yN ( N ) and  N , we can compute the value of the opportunity to invest both for the
potential investor and for the investment partner. For A we obtain
FAN (y) = (1  )

   B
   

F V IA (y), (30)
and for B we have
FBN (y) = B

   B
   
 1
F V IA (y):
17 (31)
Of course the two agents will choose the Nash bargaining solution over the non-cooperative
one only if FAN (y)  F V CA (y) and FBN (y)  F V CB (y) or, alternatively, if (1  )

 B
 
 
 1
 1+
 1
and B

 B
 
 1     1 1+ hold simultaneously.
It is interesting to see that the condition FAN (y)  F V CA (y) implies  > B which basi-
cally means that the Nash bargaining solution guarantees that the investment will take place
(ine¢ ciently) early: yN ( N ) < y
V I . Lets recall that when we solved the same problem un-
15One can also check that  N is increasing and convex in .
16One can also check that yN ( N ) is linearly decreasing in .
17Note that, as expected, @FiN (yt)
@i
> 0; i 2 fA;Bg.
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der the non-cooperative framework in subsection 3.1.4, we found that the investment would
take place ine¢ ciently late: yV C( V C) > yV I . Comparing these two results we derive a quite
straightforward conclusion: the adopted game-theoretic framework determines the nature of the
interaction between A and B as well as the way that this is reected in the chosen investment
threshold and the value of the option to invest. The importance of this statement will become
clearer in the next subsection where the three-agent case is discussed. Summing up our results:
Proposition 9 In the case where the input is produced in-house and the completion of the
project depends on external funding, the Nash bargaining solution can replace the non-cooperative
one when the participation conditions FAN (y)  F V CA (y) ) (1  )

 B
 
    1 1+ 1
and FBN (y)  F V CB (y) ) B

 B
 
 1     1 1+ are satised. If this is the case, then
the investment occurs when the scale parameter reaches a threshold yN ( N ) =
 
 B y
V I . No-
tably, FAN (y)  F V CA (y) )  > B ) yN ( N ) < yV I which means that a Nash bargaining
solution guarantees that the investment will take place ine¢ ciently early.
For instance, for  = 0:025;  = 0:2; r = 0:05; y0 = M = 1;  = 0:5 and I = 24, the Nash
bargaining solution can take place for any B 2 [0:147; 0:236]. If e.g. B = 20%, we have
yN = 1:45; FAN = 15:13 and FBN = 4; 61. Comparing these with the corresponding values of
TABLE 1 we see that, as expected, the option values of both parties are appreciated and that
the investment threshold under Nash bargaining is smaller than the investment threshold under
vertical integration.
3.3.2 The three-agent case
Lets now see what is di¤erent if a third agent is involved in the completion of the project.
Similarly to the presentation of subsection 3.2 it is assumed that the input is produced by an
external supplier with market power. The game evolves in the following way:
1. The upstream rm C decides the input price that maximizes her/his individual option
value.
2. Given the price of the input, A and B engage in a Nash bargaining in order to decide
the compensation that A will submit to B and nally,
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3. A decides what is the optimal investment threshold given the price of the input and the
decided compensation.
Moving backwards, I begin by studying the behavior of A. The optimal investment threshold
in the three-agent case is derived as the solution of the following maximization problem:
FA3N (y) = max
y3N ( ;p)

(1   ) y3N ( ; p)M
r      (1  ) p

y
y3N ( ; p)

(32)
From the rst-order condition we obtain
y3N ( ; p) =

   1
r   
M
p
1  
1   : (33)
Given y3N ( ; p), A and B engage in a Nash bargaining in order to commonly decide the optimal
compensation  3N which is derived as the solution of
max
 3N

 3N
y3N ( 3N )M
r      I
B 
(1   3N )
y3N ( 3N )M
r      (1  ) I
1 B  y
y3N ( 3N )

:
(34)
Solving we obtain
 3N =
 (   1) + B (1  )
    : (35)
Unsurprisingly, we nd  3N =  N : The intuition behind this result is that, as in the non-
cooperative case, the presence/absence of C does not a¤ect the interaction between A and B
since the exogenously given cost share  has to do with the generic investment cost no matter
if that is I or p.
Finally, the input supplier C observes how A and B behave and chooses the familiar p3N =

 1I solving FC3N (y) = maxp3N
(p3N   I)

y
y3N ( 3N ;p3N )

. Apparently, the price that maximizes
the value of the option to invest for the upstream rm is not a¤ected by the distribution of
bargaining power between A and B. Again, C is indi¤erent to the means that A uses to fund
her/his project.
Now, substituting  3N and p3N in the formula for the investment threshold we obtain
y3N ( 3N ; p3N ) =

   1
   
   B
yV I > yN ( N ) : (36)
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Similarly to yN ( N ), the threshold y3N ( 3N ; p3N ) is increasing in B.
18 One can also check
that, contrary to the two-agent case where we had
@
yN ( N )
yV I
@ ? 0 for  ? B, here we have
@
y3N ( 3N;p3N )
yV I
@ < 0 which means that as the volatility of the scale parameter increases, the
relative investment threshold gets larger, irrespective of how B compares to . This has to
do with the fact that the delivery price p3N , contrary to I, is increasing in the volatility of
the scale parameter and, as a result, there is no level of bargaining power low enough to
guarantee a negative relationship between the relative investment threshold and the volatility.
As a consequence, we have y3N ( 3N ; p3N ) > y
V I . Note that this is the result of two opposing
forces. On one hand, the interaction between A and B drives the investment threshold below
yV I but,19 on the other, the e¤ect of the presence of C has the opposite direction.20 Apparently
the second one prevails. It is interesting to recall here that when we discussed the three-agent
case under the non-cooperative setting in subsection 3.2, we similarly had y3 ( 3; p3) > y
V I .
However, there the two e¤ects were not opposing but, on the contrary, they were complementing
each other. As a result, the importance of explicitly taking C into account was, to some extent,
less obvious.
We conclude with the value of the option to invest for the three agents and we have
FA3N (y) = (1  )

   1

 1   B
   

F V IA (y); (37.1)
FB3N (y) = B

   1

 1   B
   
 1
F V IA (y); (37.2)
FC3N (y) =

   1

    B
   

F V IA (y): (37.3)
A and B will choose the Nash bargaining solution over the non-cooperative one only if
FA3N (y)  FA3(y) and FB3N (y)  FB3(y). As in the previous subsection, we nd that if
the conditions (1  )

 B
 
    1 1+ 1 and B  B   1     1 1+ hold simul-
taneously, then both A and B are better-o¤. Once again this has to do with the fact that
the presence/absence of C does not a¤ect the interaction between A and B. Finally, as far
18Note that, similarly to yN ( N ), y3N ( 3N ; p3N ) is linearly decreasing in .
19This rst e¤ect was discussed in subsection 3.3.1.
20This second e¤ect was discussed in subsection 3.1.3.
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as C is concerned, the Nash bargaining solution is preferred to the non-cooperative one when
FC3N (y)  FC3(y))

 B
 

>

 1
 1+

. One can easily check that this is always the case
since FA3N (y)  FA3(y) implies FC3N (y)  FC3(y). Concluding we have:
Proposition 10 In the case where the input is outsourced and the completion of the project
depends on external funding, the Nash bargaining solution can replace the non-cooperative one
when the participation conditions FA3N (y)  FA3(y) , FAN (y)  F V CA (y) and FB3N (y) 
FB3(y) , FBN (y)  F V CB (y) hold simultaneously. If this is the case, the investment occurs
when the scale parameter reaches a threshold y3N ( 3N ; p3N ) =

 1
 
 B y
V I > yV I i.e. the
investment takes place ine¢ ciently late. Despite the fact that the presence of B favors the ac-
celeration of the project21 the presence of C, which dictates the postponement of the investment,
prevails.
For instance, for  = 0:025;  = 0:2; r = 0:05; y0 = M = 1;  = 0:5 and I = 24, the Nash
bargaining solution can take place, as before, for any B 2 [0:147; 0:236]. If e.g. B = 20%,
we have: y3N = 4:59; FA3N = 8:89, FB3N = 2; 71 and FC3N = 5; 61. Comparing these with
the corresponding values of TABLE 1 we see that, as expected, the option values of all three
parties are appreciated and that the investment threshold under Nash bargaining is larger than
the investment threshold under vertical integration.
21See Proposition 9.
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3.4 Appendix
3.4.1 The input is produced in-house and the investment is partly externally
funded: A review of subsection 3.1.4
In the main body of the paper I describe the interaction between a potential investor A and an
investment partner B following the presentation by Lukas andWelling (2014) according to which
A is the game-leader submitting the compensation o¤er and B is the game-follower choosing
the investment timing. This framework seems suitable to describe the e¤orts of a potential
investor who seeks out funding for the business plan that is under consideration. However, one
can also consider the case where B is the game-leader submitting the compensation o¤er and A
is the game-follower deciding the investment timing. This framework seems more appropriate
to describe partnerships in which a venture capitalist makes the rst step declaring her/his
interest to invest in an emerging rm.22
Moving backwards, we nd that the solution of As decision problem gives an investment
threshold yRV C = 1 1  y
V I whereas the solution of Bs decision problem gives a compensation
share  RV C = 1 2+  .
23 Combining the two we nd that the optimal investment threshold is
given by
yRV C
 
 RV C

=
   
   1y
V I
 
> yV I

: (A.1)
As far as the value of the option to invest is concerned, for the potential investor A we have
FRV CA (y) = (1  )

   1
   

F V IA (y), (A.2)
whereas for the investment partner B we obtain
FRV CB (y) =

   1
   
 1
F V IA (y): (A.3)
One can easily check that, similarly to what we nd in subsection 3.1.4, the presence of rm
B causes the postponement of the investment24, making the potential investor worse-o¤ with
22Cvitani´c et al. (2011) present a similar case.
23Check that  RV C , similarly to  V C , is increasing in , but contrary to  V C is decreasing in .
24Note that yRV C , similarly to yV C , is decreasing in , but contrary to yV C is decreasing in .
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respect to the vertically integrated case.
3.4.2 The three-agent case: A review of subsection 3.2
In this subsection I review the three-agent case as presented in subsection 3.2 assuming however
that A and B swap places. More precisely:
1. C is still the game-leader who decides the input price.
2. Given the price of the input, B decides what is the optimal compensation that s/he
should ask from A and
3. A decides what is the optimal investment threshold given the price of the input and the
compensation share.
Solving backwards, from the potential investors maximization problem we obtain y3R ( ; p) =

 1
1 
1  
r 
M
p. Taking this into consideration, the investment partner is choosing  3R =
1 2+
  
=  RV C

.25 Finally, the upstream rm, keeping in mind the reactions of A and B, decides the
optimal price of the input p3R =

 1I. Plugging the compensation o¤er and the input price in
the formula for the investment threshold we obtain
y3R ( 3R; p3R) =

   1
   
   1y
V I
 
> yV I

: (A.4)
Given this, we also have
FA3R(y) = (1  )

   1

 1   1
   

F V IA (y); (A.5.1)
FB3R(y) =

   1

 1   1
   
 1
F V IA (y); (A.5.2)
FC3R(y) =

   1

    1
   

F V IA (y): (A.5.3)
Similarly to subsection 3.2, we nd that the synchronous presence of B and C causes the
postponement of the project and that this is also reected in As option value.
Finally, note that from Eq. (A.2), Eq. (A.3) and Eq. (A.5) we nd that FRV C(y) =
25Check that the equality  3R =  
RV C is analogous to the equality  3 =  
V C that we nd in subsection 3.2
of the main body of the paper.
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2  1
 1

 1
 

F V IA (y) and F3R(y) =

1   +   1 +  1

 1

 1 
 1
 

F V IA (y).
26 Sum-
ming up
Proposition 11 A comparison among the option values and the investment triggers derived
in subsection 3.4.1 and subsection 3.4.2 of the Appendix gives the following rankings:
1) y3R ( 3R; p3R) > y
OS
 
pOS

> yRV C
 
 RV C

> yV I ,
2) F3R(y) < FOS(y) < FRV C(y) < F V IA (y),
3) FA3R(y) < FRV CA (y) < F
OS
A (y) < F
V I
A (y),
4) FB3R(y) < FRV CB (y) and
5) FC3R(y) < FOSC (y).
Comparing Proposition 11 (where B is the game-leader and A is the game-follower) with
Proposition 8 (where A is the game-leader and B is the game-follower) we nd that, in both
cases, as the number of agents involved in an investment project increases, the completion of
the project is postponed at the expense of the projects option value both in the rm and in the
industry level. We also nd that the rankings of the investment thresholds and the aggregate
option values remain the same whereas the only di¤erence that we observe has to do with the
ranking of As option values. As one can see, when A is the game-follower (game-leader), an
interaction with C (B) is preferred to an interaction with B (C) which means that the way that
A is a¤ected by the presence of the alien rms depends on the role that s/he has in the game.
Another interesting point is that FRV CA (y) < F
V C
A (y) and F
RV C
B (y) > F
V C
B (y) which means
that being the game-leader is always preferable, no matter the values of  and . Finally, one can
also check that yRV C
 
 RV C

? yV C
 
 V C

and y3R ( 3R; p3R) ? y3 ( 3; p3), and consequently
that FRV C(y) 7 F V C(y) and F3R(y) 7 F3(y), when 0:5 ? . In words, it is socially optimal for
the agent who undertakes the lions share of the sunk investment cost to be the game-leader
either when the input is outsourced or not. This means that the analysis of the main body of
the paper where A is the game-leader and B is the game-follower would be preferred from a
social point of view for 0:5 <  whereas the analysis presented here would be socially preferable
for 0:5 > .
26We dene FRV C(y)  FRV CA (y) + FRV CB (y) and F3R(y)  FA3R(y) + FB3R(y) + FC3R(y).
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3.4.3 The input is produced in-house and the investment is partly externally
funded: A review of subsection 3.3.1
In subsection 3.4.1 I presented a leader-follower game where B decides the compensation and,
given that, A chooses the optimal investment threshold. Lets now see what is di¤erent if
the compensation is the product of bargaining between the two agents. The game evolves in
the following way: initially A and B bargain over the compensation share  and then, given
that, B decides the optimal investment threshold. Notice that contrary to subsection 3.4.1,
the time-deciding agent is B, not A. Alternatively put, my goal in this section is to nd the
conditions under which A would be willing to let B decide the timing of the investment, given
that the compensation share will be the product of bargaining between the two agents instead
of a unilateral decision of B.
Starting with the maximization problem of the time-deciding agent B we obtain yNR =

 y
V I . Moving one step back, the two parties bargain anticipating that B will invest as soon
as yt reaches the threshold yNR. Given this, the bargaining over the compensation share gives
 NR = 
 1+B
 1+
27and, consequently,
yNR( NR) =
   1 + 
   1 + B
yV I .28 (B.1)
Given the compensation o¤er and the optimal investment threshold, one can compute the
value of the option to invest both for the potential investor and for the time-deciding investment
partner. More precisely, for A we obtain
FANR(y) = (1  B)

   1 + B
   1 + 
 1
F V IA (y), (B.2)
and for B we have
FBNR(y) = 

   1 + B
   1 + 

F V IA (y): (B.3)
27One can check that the compensation share  NR increases linearly in B and that it is also increasing and
concave in . Finally, @ NR
@
? 0 for  ? B .
28yNR( NR) is decreasing in B , linearly increasing in  and, with respect to , we have
@
yNR( NR)
yV I
@
? 0 if
B ? . This basically means that in the special case where B =  we have exactly yNR( NR) = yV I but, in
general, when the bargaining power of B is su¢ ciently low (high), an increase in volatility results in a higher
(lower) investment threshold yNR( NR) relative to y
V I .
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As expected, A and B will choose the Nash bargaining solution over the non-cooperative one
only if FANR(y)  FRV CA (y) and FBNR(y)  FRV CB (y) or, alternatively, if (1  B)

 1+B
 1+
 1 
(1  )

 1
 

and 

 1+B
 1+
   1  1 hold simultaneously. One can also easily check
that the condition FBNR(y)  FRV CB (y) implies  < B which means that any Nash bargaining
solution guarantees that the investment will take place (ine¢ ciently) early. Note that this is
no di¤erent from what we found in subsection 3.3.1 of the main body of the paper.
3.4.4 The three-agent case: A review of subsection 3.3.2
Lets now see what is di¤erent if the input is outsourced. The starting point is again the
investment threshold decision by B. From the rst-order condition we have y3NR( ; p) =

 1
r 
M
p  . Moving one step back, A and B bargain anticipating that B will invest as soon
as yt reaches the chosen threshold and eventually choose  3NR = 
 1+B
 1+ (=  NR).
29 Finally,
the game-leader C observes the behavior of A and B and decides the input price p3NR =

 1I.
Substituting the optimal price and the compensation o¤er in the investment threshold from
above we have
y3NR( 3NR; p3NR) =

   1
   1 + 
   1 + B
yV I : (B.4)
Note that y3NR( 3NR; p3NR) > y
V I .30 This is the result of two opposing forces. On one hand,
the interaction between A and B drives the investment trigger below yV I but,31 on the other,
the e¤ect of the presence of C has the opposite direction.32 Apparently, the second one prevails.
It is interesting to recall that Eq. (A.4) that corresponds to the non-cooperative case gives also
an investment threshold higher than yV I : y3R ( 3R; p3R) > y
V I . However, there the two e¤ects
were not opposing but, on the contrary, they were complementing each other. Note that the
analysis here is totally symmetric to the one presented in subsection 3.3.2 of the main body of
the paper.
Keeping in mind the formulas for  3NR, p3NR and y3NR( 3NR; p3NR), the option values for
29Check that the equality  3NR =  NR is analogous to the equality  3N =  N that we nd in subsection
3.3.2 of the main body of the paper.
30Note also that
@
y3NR( 3NR;p3NR)
yV I
@
< 0.
31This e¤ect was discussed in subsection 3.4.3.
32This e¤ect was discussed in subsection 3.1.3.
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the three agents are
FA3NR(y) = (1  B)

   1

   1 + B
   1 + 
 1
F V IA (y); (B.5.1)
FB3NR(y) = 

   1

 1   1 + B
   1 + 

F V IA (y); (B.5.2)
FC3NR(y) =

   1

    1 + B
   1 + 

F V IA (y): (B.5.3)
A and B will choose the Nash bargaining solution over the non-cooperative one only if
FA3NR(y)  FA3R(y) and FB3NR(y)  FB3R(y) or, alternatively, if the familiar (1  B)

 1+B
 1+
 1 
(1  )

 1
 

and 

 1+B
 1+
   1  1 hold simultaneously. As far as C is con-
cerned, the Nash bargaining solution is preferred to the non-cooperative one when FC3NR(y) 
FC3R(y) )

 1+B
 1+
   1 . One can easily see that this is always the case since
FB3NR(y)  FB3R(y) implies FC3NR(y)  FC3R(y). Concluding we have:
Proposition 12 In the case where the input is outsourced and the completion of the project
depends on external funding, the Nash bargaining solution can replace the non-cooperative
one when the participation conditions FA3NR(y)  FA3R(y) , FANR(y)  FRV CA (y) and
FB3NR(y)  FB3R(y) , FBNR(y)  FRV CB (y) hold simultaneously. If this is the case, the in-
vestment occurs when the scale parameter reaches a threshold y3NR( 3NR; p3NR) =

 1
 1+
 1+B y
V I >
yV I , i.e., the investment takes place ine¢ ciently late. Despite the fact that the presence of B
favors the acceleration of the project the presence of C, which dictates the postponement of the
investment, prevails.
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Chapter 4
Synthesis of paper 2
In this paper a stochastic dynamic programming model is used to examine an investment project
that: i) is characterized by uncertainty and irreversibility, ii) is undertaken in a decentralized
setting and iii) depends on the provision of a necessary input by an external supplier with
market power. Bearing in mind the di¤erent ways that the game might unfold, I examine how:
1. the agency conict between the project originator and the project manager,
2. the timing and
3. the value of the investment opportunity,
are a¤ected by the presence of the upstream rm.
4.1 The model
4.1.1 The basic set-up
Firm P holds the option to undertake an investment project and delegates the decision rights
to agent B.1 The value of the project, net of the wage of the agent, is represented by Xt which
is assumed to be uctuating over time according to the following geometric Brownian motion:
dXt
Xt
= dt+ dzt; X0 = x (1)
1Decentralization of decision-making is a standard practice when managing large enterprises (see e.g. Amaral
et al., 2006 and Lee and Whang, 1999).
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The term  stands for the positive constant drift,  is the positive constant volatility and dzt
is the increment of a Wiener process. It is assumed that P can continuously and veriably
observe the realizations of Xt over time and, in order to guarantee coordination in the supply
chain, s/he shares this information with the delegate B.2
The completion of the aforementioned investment project is assumed to be conditional
on the procurement of a discrete input that is exclusively produced by an upstream rm A.
The supplier A is pricing the input taking into consideration information related both to the
structure of the downstream industry and to the evolution of the stochastic parameter.3
Unless otherwise specied (see subsections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3), agent B is delegated not only
with the investment decision, but with the procurement of the discrete input as well. Conse-
quently, s/he knows the true magnitude of the input price whereas P knows only its distribu-
tion.4 The asymmetry of information and the corresponding incentive misalignment between
the delegate B and the delegator P , imply that P will have to use a bonus-incentive mechanism
to make B reveal private information at the time of the exercise of the investment option in
order to prevent further distortions.
All the parties are assumed to be risk neutral with the risk-free interest rate denoted by r.
For convergence I assume r > .5
Before analyzing the agency conict under the presence of an external input supplier, I
briey review the case with information symmetry and in-house production of the input in
subsection 4.1.2 and the case with information asymmetry and in-house production of the
input in subsection 4.2.3.
4.1.2 Information symmetry and in-house production of the input
In this subsection it is assumed that B is in the position to produce the needed input in-house,
and, consequently, s/he does not need to procure the input from an external supplier.6 Before
2 Information sharing among members of a supply chain is an important mechanism for coordination. See for
instance, Lee and Whang (1998), Lee et al. (2004) and Agrell and Bogetoft (2017).
3The exact information endowment will be presented in detail in the beginning of each relevant section.
4This is the "delegation to a middleman" case from Mookherjee and Tsumagari (2004) and Mookherjee (2006).
5See e.g. Dixit and Pindyck (1994, pp. 138).
6We tacitly assume that if B can manufacture the needed input in-house, s/he will do so. In other words,
insourcing is assumed to be always less costly than outsourcing.
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discussing the delegation of the investment decision from P to B, lets recall that, according to
the real options literature, when a potential investor contemplates undertaking an investment
project characterized by uncertainty and irreversibility, the ability to delay the investment for
some future time point is a source of exibility that profoundly a¤ects the decision to invest
(see e.g. McDonald and Siegel, 1986). The investment takes place only as soon as the projects
expected payo¤ exceeds the cost of the investment by a margin equal to the option value of
further postponing the completion of the project into the future.7
Let F (x; I) denote the value of the opportunity to invest in a project the value of which
uctuates over time according to process (1), and I denote the corresponding sunk investment
cost. Assuming that the initial state value x is su¢ ciently small so that investing at time zero
is not preferable,8 the optimal investment time point  is derived through the solution of the
following maximization problem:
F (x; I) = max

Ex

e r (X   I) ; (2.1)
which can be rearranged as9
F (x; I) = max
X
(X   I)
 x
X

; (2.2)
where:
-  = inf ft > 0 jXt = X g is the random rst time point that Xt hits the barrier X which
is the project value that triggers the investment and,
-  = 12   2 +
q  
2
  12
2
+ 2r
2
> 1 is the positive root of the characteristic equation
1
2
2(   1) +    r = 0.10
Now, applying the real options approach to our context, the project originator P contem-
plates investing in a project like the one described in problem (2), and delegates the correspond-
7OBrien et al. (2003) present strong empirical evidence in favor of this argument. More precisely, they nd
that entrepreneurs account for the value of the option to delay entering a new market when contemplating such
a decision.
8 If the initial state value x is su¢ ciently large so that investing at time zero is preferable, our problem reduces
to a standard net present value maximization since the option to invest is exercised as soon as possible.
9For the calculation of expected present values, see Dixit and Pindyck (1994, pp. 315-316).
10The expressions for F (x; I) and  are standard in the real options literature (see e.g. Dixit and Pindyck,
1994).
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ing investment decision to the project manager B. The generic term I corresponds in this case
to the in-house production cost of the input. I assume that I can take one of two possible
values: I1 with probability q or I2 with probability 1  q where I2 > I1 > 0 and I  I2  I1.11
Of course, I1 represents a "lower" whereas I2 a "higher" expenditure.
Under symmetry of information, that is when the true magnitude of I is known both to
the principal and to the agent, B has no informational advantage over P and, consequently, it
is as if we are dealing with a problem without delegation of the investment decision. In this
case B is just an intermediary who is granted access to exactly enough resources to successfully
complete the delegated task. Consequently, the ex-ante optimization problem for P is
max
XSI1 ;X
SI
2
q
 
XSI1   I1
 x
XSI1

+ (1  q)  XSI2   I2 xXSI2

; (3)
where XSIi , i 2 f1; 2g are the investment thresholds under symmetry of information.12 From
the rst-order conditions we have
XSIi =

   1Ii; i 2 f1; 2g : (4)
Note that, since I2 > I1, we obtain XSI2 > X
SI
1 . In words, the completion of a more expensive
investment project is, in expected terms, realized later.
Last, Ps ex-ante value of the opportunity to invest can be written as:
f (x; I1; I2) = qF (x; I1) + (1  q)F (x; I2) (5.1)
= q
I1
   1

x
XSI1

+ (1  q) I2
   1

x
XSI2

(5.2)
As one can easily see, the quantity f (x; I1; I2) is the ex-ante value of the opportunity to invest,
not only for the project originator, but for the whole industry as well.13
11 In the Appendix (subsection 4.4.2) I extend the analysis considering a continuous I.
12The superscript SI refers to symmetry of information.
13Since B has no informational advantage over P under information symmetry, her/his option value is equal
to zero.
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4.1.3 Information asymmetry and in-house production of the input
As in the previous subsection, B is qualied to produce the discrete input in-house. What is
di¤erent from before is that now the true I is not common knowledge but is instead assumed
to be privately observed by the agent B. This is a reasonable assumption since the individual
with the best information on the production cost is usually the producer her/himself (Celik,
2009). Of course, this implies an information asymmetry between P and B. As in Grenadier
and Wang (2005), Amaral et al. (2006) and Shibata (2009), this information asymmetry results
in an agency conict since the agent has an incentive to report the higher I2 when I1 is the true
production cost, attempting to appropriate the positive di¤erence I. The principal might not
be able to observe the true I verifying the agents (dis)honesty, but s/he can induce B to reveal
the true magnitude of the expenditure by giving a bonus-incentive. In order to do so, s/he
designs a menu of contracts contingent on the observable Xt.
It is assumed that P submits the menu of contracts to her/his delegate at time zero and
that the chosen contract commits the actions of the two parties at the time of the investment.14
Once the menu of contracts is submitted, B observes the true I and chooses the corresponding
contract. Given that I can take one of two possible values, "high" or "low", this menu is
comprised by two contracts consisting of one money transfer (t) and one investment threshold 
XAI

each.15 The principals objective is to maximize the ex-ante value of the investment
opportunity through the choice of the contract terms

XAIi ; ti
	
; i 2 f1; 2g. The problem that
P needs to solve is formulated as:
max
f(XAI1 ;t1);(XAI2 ;t2)g
q
 
XAI1   t1
 x
XAI1

+ (1  q)  XAI2   t2 xXAI2

(6.1)
14Renegotiation of the contract terms is not allowed. This assumption is justied if the contract is enforceable
and if the market of the agent is competitive. For a similar treatment see Grenadier and Wang (2005) and
Shibata (2009).
15Note that one can also allow for a menu of contracts comprised by one pair of t and XAI , i.e. a pooling
equilibrium. However, the pooling equilibrium is always dominated by a separating one and this allows us to
focus on the latter. See e.g. Shibata (2009).
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Subject to:
(t1   I1)

x
XAI1

 (t2   I1)

x
XAI2

(7.1)
(t2   I2)

x
XAI2

 (t1   I2)

x
XAI1

(8.1)
t1   I1  0 (9.1)
t2   I2  0 (10.1)
q (t1   I1)

x
XAI1

+ (1  q) (t2   I2)

x
XAI2

 0 (11.1)
As one can see, the objective function in problem (6.1) is symmetric to the objective function
in problem (3).16 The only di¤erence between the two is that the money transfer ti replaces
the cost expenditure Ii.
The inequalities (7.1) and (8.1) are the incentive compatibility constraints. They guarantee
that if agent B observes that the true I is equal to Ii, s/he will (weakly) prefer contract
XAIi ; ti
	
to contract
n
XAIj ; tj
o
where i; j 2 f1; 2g and i 6= j. In other words, constraints (7.1)
and (8.1) guarantee that, at the time of the investment, the reported I is the true one. As one
can see, an incentive compatible scheme eliminates potential incentive misalignments since both
the principal and the agent are better-o¤ when following the decision rules that are optimal for
the system as a whole.17
The inequalities (9.1) and (10.1) are the limited liability conditions and they are necessary
to provide an incentive for the agent to get involved in the project.18 Finally, inequality (11.1)
is the agents ex-ante participation constraint which ensures that Bs total value of accepting
to abide by Ps menu of contracts is non-negative.
The problem (6.1)-(11.1) can be alternatively formulated in the following way:
max
f(XAI1 ;w1);(XAI2 ;w2)g
q
 
XAI1   w1   I1
 x
XAI1

+ (1  q)  XAI2   w2   I2 xXAI2

(6.2)
16The superscript AI denotes asymmetry of information.
17See e.g. Lee and Whang (1999).
18 If the limited liability conditions do not hold, Bs involvement in the project might generate losses.
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Subject to:
w1

x
XAI1

 (w2 +I)

x
XAI2

(7.2)
w2

x
XAI2

 (w1  I)

x
XAI1

(8.2)
w1  0 (9.2)
w2  0 (10.2)
qw1

x
XAI1

+ (1  q)w2

x
XAI2

 0 (11.2)
The term wi = ti   Ii; i 2 f1; 2g stands for the information rent. Formally, the information
rent is dened as the di¤erence between the money transfer tk and the true expenditure Ii:
wk;i  tk   Ii, i; k 2 f1; 2g where k is the reported, but not necessarily true (i), expenditure.19
Of course under incentive compatibility the reported and the true expenditures coincide (k = i)
which gives wi;i = ti   Ii. By slightly abusing notation, wi;i reduces to wi which is the term
appearing above.
Solving the problem (6)-(11) we obtain the following menu of contracts:20

XAI1 (I1) ; w1 (I1; I2)
	
=
(

   1I1;

XAI1 (I1)
XAI2 (I1; I2)

I
)
(12.1)

XAI2 (I1; I2) ; w2 (I1; I2)
	
=


   1I2 +

   1
q
1  qI; 0

(12.2)
Thanks to the incentive compatibility conditions, contract (12.1) will be chosen by B when the
cost turns out to be equal to I1, whereas, contract (12.2) will be chosen when the cost turns
out to be equal to I2.
Note that, on one hand, XAI1 (I1) = X
SI
1 (I1), X
AI
2 (I1; I2) > X
SI
2 (I2) and that, on the
other, w1 (I1; I2) > 0, w2 (I1; I2) = 0. In words, the agency conict does not a¤ect the timing
of the investment when I1 is observed, but it does when I2 is observed causing the (subopti-
mal) postponement of the investment. However, this does not mean that when I1 is the true
investment cost there is no distortion since a positive information rent is to be paid to B.
19See e.g. La¤ont and Martimort, 2002.
20The solution of the problem is analytically presented in the Appendix (subsection 4.4.1).
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Substituting the components of menu (12) in the value functions of the two parties we obtain
VP (x; I1; I2) = q
 
XAI1 (I1)  I1   w1 (I1; I2)
 x
XAI1 (I1)

(13)
+(1  q)  XAI2 (I1; I2)  I2 xXAI2 (I1; I2)

;
VB (x; I1; I2) = qw1 (I1; I2)

x
XAI1 (I1)

; (14)
where VP (x; I1; I2) and VB (x; I1; I2) stand for the investment opportunity values of the prin-
cipal and the agent respectively. The total value of the project V (x; I1; I2)  VP (x; I1; I2) +
VB (x; I1; I2), is then equal to:
V (x; I1; I2) = q
 
XAI1 (I1)  I1
 x
XAI1 (I1)

+ (1  q)  XAI2 (I1; I2)  I2 xXAI2 (I1; I2)

(15)
Note that this is symmetric to Eq. (5). The only di¤erence between the two is that, in Eq.
(15), the larger XAI2 (I1; I2) replaces the smaller X
SI
2 (I2) resulting in
V (x; I1; I2) < f (x; I1; I2) . (16)
In words, the agency conict between the principal and the agent that stems from the corre-
sponding information asymmetry is reected in a suboptimally lower aggregate option value.
4.2 A as the exclusive producer of the input
Up to now, we have discussed the interaction between the principal P and the agent B assuming
that the latter can produce the needed input in-house. Nevertheless, the project manager might
lack the equipment and/or the expertise to manufacture the needed input (Deshpande et al.,
2011). Investment projects are often rather complex and relationship-specic inputs tailored
to a specic client are common in supply chains (Agrell and Bogetoft, 2017). Keeping this in
mind, I now assume that the upstream rm A is the exclusive producer of the required input.
As outlined in subsection 4.1.1, A is pricing the input considering information related both
to the structure of the downstream industry and to the evolution of Xt. More precisely,
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- In subsection 4.2.1 I examine the case of a non-transparent supply chain in the sense
that every individual in the supply chain is dealing exclusively with her/his immediate neigh-
bor(s).21 In this case, P delegates to B not only the exercise of the investment decision but
the procurement of the necessary input as well. At the same time, A prices the input that s/he
sells to B knowing the fundamental parameters of process (1) but without ever observing the
true magnitude of Xt.
- In subsection 4.2.2 I allow for a more transparent framework where all the companies in
the supply chain are able to track the products ow throughout the production process. In
this case, P still delegates the investment decision to B but can now procure the input directly
from A if this proves to be the best alternative. The upstream rm A is now informed about
the delegation of the project from P to B but still prices the input knowing nothing but the
fundamental parameters of process (1).
- Last, in subsection 4.2.3 I discuss a fully transparent supply chain where P;B and A all
share the same information about Xt.
4.2.1 Non-transparent supply chain
In this subsection I discuss a non-transparent supply chain in the sense that the upstream rm
A deals only with the project manager B and prices the produced input knowing the structural
parameters of process (1) but without ever observing the true magnitude ofXt. Non-transparent
supply chains are often found in consumer industries such as the garment industry (Boström
et al., 2012; Doorey, 2011).
Algebraically, As problem is given by
max
p1;p2
q (p1   I1)

x
XM1 (p1)

+ (1  q) (p2   I2)

x
XM2 (p2)

; (17)
where pi is the price of the input when the in-house production cost is Ii and XMi (pi) ; i 2 f1; 2g
is the relevant investment threshold.
A is choosing pi anticipating that B will complete the (supposedly private) investment once
the investment threshold XMi (pi) =

 1pi; i 2 f1; 2g is reached. Of course the formula for
21The plural is for B who is purchasing the input from A in order to deliver Ps project.
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XMi (pi) is identical to the one for X
SI
i from Eq. (4) if, instead of Ii, we use pi.
22 Given this,
we solve the maximization problem (17) and we obtain:
pi =

   1Ii; i 2 f1; 2g (18)
Note that, unsurprisingly, pi > Ii which means that the presence of an upstream rm with
market power naturally makes the investment more costly.23
Now, we can go back to the agency conict as it was discussed in subsection 4.1.3 and see
how the replacement of Ii by pi a¤ects our results. Replacing also I with p  p2   p1 we
obtain:

XR1 (p1) ; !1 (p1; p2)
	
=
(

   1p1;

XR1 (p1)
XR2 (p1; p2)

p
)
(19.1)

XR2 (p1; p2) ; !2 (p1; p2)
	
=


   1p2 +

   1
q
1  qp; 0

(19.2)
The term !i stands for the information rent that the delegate B receives through the menu of
contracts in (19), whereas the term XRi stands for the (real) investment threshold.
24 Note that
XR1 (p1) = X
M
1 (p1) but X
R
2 (p1; p2) > X
M
2 (p2). This implies that As inability to acknowledge
that s/he is selling the input to the agent, and not to the principal, is costly when the true I
is equal to I2. In that case, the upstream rm expects to cash the lump sum p2 when XM2 (p2)
is reached but will have to wait until Xt reaches the higher XR2 (p1; p2) before this actually
happens.
22Analytically, the term XMi (pi) =

 1pi; i 2 f1; 2g is derived solving max
XM1 ;X
M
2
q
 
XM1   p1
 
x
XM1

+
(1  q)  XM2   p2  xXM2  which of course is reminiscent of the maximization problem (3).
23Note also that, thanks to I2 > I1, we obtain p2 > p1.
24The derivation of menu (19) is totally symmetric to the one of menu (12).
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The option values for the three parties P , B and A are:
P (x; p1; p2) = q
 
XR1 (p1)  p1   !1 (p1; p2)
 x
XR1 (p1)

(20)
+(1  q)  XR2 (p1; p2)  p2 xXR2 (p1; p2)

B (x; p1; p2) = q!1 (p1; p2)

x
XR1 (p1)

(21)
AR (x; p1; p2) = q (p1   I1)

x
XR1 (p1)

+ (1  q) (p2   I2)

x
XR2 (p1; p2)

(22.1)
Note that A anticipates to receive
AM (x; p1; p2) = q (p1   I1)

x
XM1 (p1)

+ (1  q) (p2   I2)

x
XM2 (p2)

; (22.2)
where AR (x; p1; p2) < AM (x; p1; p2). As I have already underlined above, the di¤erence
between the true AR and the expected AM has to do with the di¤erence between XR2 (p1; p2)
and XM2 (p2).
Last, the aggregate value of the investment opportunity is:
(x; p1; p2)  P (x; p1; p2) + B (x; p1; p2) + AR (x; p1; p2) = (23.1)
q
 
XR1 (p1)  I1
 x
XR1 (p1)

+ (1  q)  XR2 (p1; p2)  I2 xXR2 (p1; p2)

(23.2)
Lets now check how the presence of the upstream rm A a¤ects the timing and the value
of the investment. As we have already seen above, the presence of a supplier with market
power makes the investment more costly since pi=Ii = =   1, i 2 f1; 2g. The fact that the
investment is more expensive is then reected in higher investment thresholds and a larger
information rent. More precisely, we have:
XR1 (p1)
XAI1 (I1)
=
XR2 (p1; p2)
XAI2 (I1; I2)
=
!1 (p1; p2)
w1 (I1; I2)
=

   1 > 1 (24)
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One can also show that
P (x; p1; p2) < VP (x; I1; I2) ; (25.1)
B (x; p1; p2) < VB (x; I1; I2) ; (25.2)
(x; p1; p2) < V (x; I1; I2) : (25.3)
In words, the presence of an external supplier with market power makes both the project
originator and the project manager worse-o¤ a result which is eventually mirrored in a lower
aggregate option value.25
The following proposition summarizes our ndings:
Proposition 13 Consider an investment project the completion of which depends on the pro-
vision of a necessary input that is exclusively produced by an upstream rm with market power.
Assume also that the project originator delegates both the procurement of the necessary input
and the investment decision to a project manager with an informational advantage. Then,
comparing this case with the one where the needed input is produced in-house by the project
manager,
i) the sunk investment cost and the corresponding investment triggers are larger whereas,
ii) the value of the opportunity to invest for the principal, the agent and the whole supply
chain is smaller.
4.2.2 The case of traceability
In a supply chain setting, the term transparency is often used as a synonym of traceability, i.e.
the disclosure of the names of the suppliers involved in a supply chain to the other rms in the
supply chain as well as to end-users.26 For instance, Nike, Adidas and H&M have disclosed the
names of their rst-tier suppliers whereas the All American Clothing Co allows consumers to
trace the ow of the nal product from the cotton eld and onward.27
25Using standard option valuation arguments, we know that a rm stands to gain more by exercising rather
than holding an investment option with a low strike price. In our setting where pi > Ii, one expects to nd
XRi > X
AI
i , i 2 f1; 2g and Vj > j , j 2 fP;Bg which is exactly what we have in Eq. (24) and Eq. (25).
26See e.g. Doorey (2011) and Laudal (2010).
27See e.g. Egels-Zanden and Hansson (2016) and the references therein.
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Supply chain transparency is usually seen as a mechanism to promote sustainability, improve
compliance with labor standards and deter unethical activities at the production site.28 Despite
the fact that many companies were initially taking a rm position against supplier factory
disclosure, transparency is perceived today as a new corporate social responsibility strategy
signaling that the corporation has "nothing to hide".29
In the present setting, traceability implies that:
i) A knows the structure of the downstream industry, that is, s/he knows that P is the
project originator whereas B is the project manager and,
ii) P knows that A is the supplier of the necessary input.
It is important to stress here that A is still assumed to be pricing the input taking into
consideration the structural parameters of process (1), but without observing the realizations
of the stochastic parameter over time. The importance of this point will become clearer in the
next subsection where this assumption will be relaxed.
Reapproaching the problem under traceability, we have the following. The input supplier
A, observing the delegation of the investment decision downstream, anticipates that the agency
conict will result in, not AM (x; p1; p2) but the smaller, AR (x; p1; p2). Of course A can
prevent that from happening by sharing the true price of the input both with B and P . This
way, the input supplier makes sure that there will be information symmetry downstream and
that, consequently, the principal will not have to use a bonus-incentive mechanism in order to
guarantee the successful delivery of the project. Actually, by pricing the input according to Eq.
(18), A can secure AM (x; p1; p2) for her/himself.
As far as the principal and the agent are concerned, the symmetry of information implies a
zero option value for B and a positive option value for P that is equal to:
P (x; p1; p2) = q
 
XM1 (p1)  p1
 x
XM1 (p1)

+ (1  q)  XM2 (p2)  p2 xXM2 (p2)

(26.1)
=

   1

 1
f (x; I1; I2) (26.2)
28See Egels-Zanden (2007), Bartley (2007) and Zyglidopoulos and Fleming (2011) respectively.
29Bhaduri and Ha-Brookshire (2011), Bradu et al. (2014) and Egels-Zanden and Hansson (2016) show that
supply chain transparency inuences positively the purchasing intentions of the consumer.
67
The inequality P (x; p1; p2) < f (x; I1; I2) implies that, even under information symmetry
downstream, the option value of the principal is suboptimal. Of course this is to be expected
since, despite the fact that P does not need to pay an information rent to B anymore, s/he still
needs to pay a "market rent" to A who exploits her/his market power as the exclusive producer
of the needed input.
The aggregate option value in this case is:
 (x; p1; p2)  P (x; p1; p2) + AM (x; p1; p2) (27.1)
= q
 
XM1 (p1)  I1
 x
XM1 (p1)

+ (1  q)  XM2 (p2)  I2 xXM2 (p2)

(27.2)
As one can see, Eq. (27) is symmetric to Eq. (5). Also, one can easily check that  (x; p1; p2) <
f (x; I1; I2) which means that the market power of the input supplier is reected in a suboptimal
aggregate option value, even under information symmetry downstream.
Lets now identify how the transparency in the supply chain a¤ects the investment project.
First of all, agent B is clearly worse-o¤ since there is no information asymmetry for her/him
to exploit. On the contrary, we see that the input supplier as well as the principal are both
better-o¤ since AR (x; p1; p2) < AM (x; p1; p2) and P (x; p1; p2) < P (x; p1; p2). This of
course has to do with the fact that the principal does not need a bonus-incentive mechanism to
guarantee that the agent reports the true investment cost. At the same time, also the aggregate
value of the investment opportunity is higher since (x; p1; p2) <  (x; p1; p2).
Summing up, traceability in a supply chain might not be benecial for the project manager
but is benecial for all other parties as well as the supply chain as a whole.
The following proposition summarizes our ndings:
Proposition 14 Consider the investment project from Proposition 13. In a supply chain where
the traceability of the nal product is guaranteed, there is no information asymmetry for the
agent to exploit. This makes the delegate worse-o¤ but is benecial for the principal, the input
supplier and the supply-chain as a whole.
Finally, one can notice that V (x; I1; I2) from Eq. (15) and  (x; p1; p2) from Eq. (27) corre-
spond to the two ends of the same spectrum: V (x; I1; I2) is the aggregate value of an investment
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project that involves downstream asymmetry of information but a perfectly competitive input
market, whereas  (x; p1; p2) is the aggregate option value of a project that involves downstream
symmetry of information but a monopolist input supplier.
4.2.3 Transparent supply chain
As stated in the previous subsection, transparency is often used as a synonym of traceability.
Nevertheless, supply chain transparency is a much broader concept since it has to do with
sharing data regarding order and production statuses and forecasts among the supply chain
partners especially when dealing with customized products like in this paper (see e.g. Gavirneni
et al.,1999 and Lee and Whang, 1999).
In this subsection, I allow for a fully transparent supply chain in the sense that, apart from
traceability, it is also assumed that P;B and A all share the same information related to the
stochastic parameter. A is now in the position to observe the realizations of Xt continuously
and veriably. In this case, s/he can specify both the investment threshold and the input price
at the same time. This way, and by dictating the investment threshold XSIi , i.e. the investment
threshold that maximizes the aggregate value of the investment opportunity, A can appropriate
all the benets above the investors reservation value. The investors reservation value is, as
expected, set equal to 
i 
 
XMi (pi)  pi
 
x
XMi (pi)

; i 2 f1; 2g.30
Keeping all this in mind, A is choosing the input price solving
max
'i
('i   Ii)

x
XSIi

(28)
such that  
XSIi   'i
 x
XSIi

 
i; i 2 f1; 2g .31 (29)
The term 'i stands for the (new) price of the input. Since the objective function in problem
(28) is increasing in 'i, the solution is derived from the constraint (29). A binding constraint
(29) implies that, 'i is such that P is indi¤erent between an investment that costs 'i and takes
30Note that, unless the reservation value is higher, or at least equal to 
i, there is not reason for P to engage
in information sharing with A.
31See Billette de Villemeur et al. (2014) for a similar treatment.
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place when XSIi is reached, and an investment that costs pi and takes place when the higher
XMi (pi) is reached. Solving we obtain
'i =

   1Ii
 
1  (   1)
 1

!
:32 (30)
The input supplier A, chooses 'i (> Ii) at X
SI
i submitting a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to the
project originator P and to her/his delegate B.
In this case, the principals ex-ante option value is:
P (x;'1; '2) = q
 
XSI1   '1
 x
XSI1

+ (1  q)  XSI2   '2 xXSI2

(31)
The ex-ante option value for A is given by:
A (x;'1; '2) = q ('1   I1)

x
XSI1

+ (1  q) ('2   I2)

x
XSI2

(32)
Finally, combining the two, the aggregate option value is
 (x;'1; '2)  P (x;'1; '2) + A (x;'1; '2) (33.1)
= q
 
XSI1   I1
 x
XSI1

+ (1  q)  XSI2   I2 xXSI2

(33.2)
= f (x; I1; I2) (33.3)
The equality  (x;'1; '2) = f (x; I1; I2) is to be expected since, as we have seen in the beginning
of this subsection, A will attempt to dictate the investment thresholds that maximize the
industry value and then appropriate all the benets above the potential investors reservation
value. In other words, by construction, we have A (x;'1; '2) = f (x; I1; I2)   P (x;'1; '2)
and consequently P (x;'1; '2) + A (x;'1; '2) = f (x; I1; I2).
Comparing the transparent supply chain with the one under traceability as this was pre-
sented in the previous subsection, we have P (x; p1; p2) = P (x;'1; '2) and A (x;'1; '2) >
AM (x; p1; p2).33 In words, while the project originator and the project manager are indi¤er-
32Note also that, thanks to I2 > I1, we obtain '2 > '1.
33Note that P (x; p1; p2) = P (x;'1; '2) holds as soon as constraint (29) is binding.
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ent between a supply chain characterized by traceability and a transparent one, both the input
supplier and the supply chain as a whole are better-o¤.
Proposition 15 summarizes our ndings:
Proposition 15 Consider the investment project from Proposition 13. In a transparent supply
chain where the principal, the agent and the input supplier can all continuously and veriably
observe the realizations of the stochastic parameter over time, the investment is realized when
the optimal investment threshold is reached. Also, despite the fact that the principal and the
agent are indi¤erent between a transparent supply chain and one characterized by traceability,
the input supplier and, consequently, the supply chain as a whole, are better-o¤.
The ndings are in accordance with real world examples from Seifert (2003) and Yan and
Pei (2011) which suggest that information sharing contributes to better decision making, fewer
coordination failures and a stronger supply chain performance.
4.3 Comparison
In this last section, I discuss the presented results and some of the assumptions of the model
in more detail.
As far as the results of the analysis are concerned, TABLE 6 presents exactly how the
sunk investment costs, the investment thresholds and the values of the investment opportunity
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change given the di¤erent levels of transparency in the supply chain.
TABLE 6
Non-transparency Traceability Transparency First-Best
Cost pi = pi > 'i Ii
Threshold XRi > XMi > XSIi XSIi
Inv. Value:
Aggregate
B
A
P

B
AR
P
<
>
<
<

0
AM
P
<
=
<
=
f
0
A
P
f
0
0
f
First of all, one can see that irrespective of the level of information sharing in the supply chain,
the presence of an upstream input supplier with market power is always making the investment
more expensive ('i > Ii; i 2 f1; 2g). Secondly, as for the investment triggers, the comparisons
suggest that the higher investment costs are not always reected in higher investment thresholds.
Actually, as we saw in subsection 4.2.3, in a transparent supply chain, the investment takes place
as soon as the optimal investment trigger is reached, i.e., there is no ine¢ cient postponement
of the investment at all. Similarly, the way that the presence of the input supplier a¤ects the
aggregate value of the investment opportunity is also ambiguous. According to Eq. (25.3), the
presence of an upstream rm with market power in a non-transparent supply chain will reduce
the value of the investment opportunity if compared to the case where the input is insourced
( (x; p1; p2) < V (x; I1; I2)). Nevertheless, the level of transparency makes a di¤erence since,
as one can see, the aggregate value of the investment opportunity reaches its rst-best when
the supply chain is transparent.
Fourthly, as far as the components of the aggregate value of the investment opportunity
are concerned, we nd that the presence of the upstream rm is a¤ecting di¤erently the prin-
cipal and the agent. Starting with the latter, the presence of the input supplier is always
making the agent worse-o¤. Even under a non-transparent supply chain which is the most
favorable scenario for the delegate, the higher sunk investment costs imply an investment
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opportunity with lower value.34 Of course, both under traceability and under transparency,
the agency conict is automatically resolved and consequently there is no information asym-
metry for the agent to exploit. This might be unfavorable for the agent but is clearly fa-
vorable for the principal who, nevertheless needs to deal with the monopolist input supplier
(P (x; p1; p2) = P (x;'1; '2) < f (x; I1; I2)).
Now, given the results presented above, it is worth stressing the di¤erence between invest-
ments undertaken in a transparent supply chain and investments undertaken in a centralized
setting. In both settings the aggregate value of the investment opportunity as well as the timing
of the investment are the same. However, the two frameworks di¤er signicantly since under
a transparent supply chain the project originator shares the project with the input supplier.
Apparently, even under frictionless information sharing, the presence of an agent with market
power changes the balance in the supply chain even if this is not translated in distortions in
the timing and/or the aggregate value of the investment.
The inequality AR (x; p1; p2) < AM (x; p1; p2) presents also an interesting result. As
we have already discussed in subsection 4.2.1, in a non-transparent supply chain the princi-
pal uses a menu of contracts to guarantee that, at the time of the investment, the project
manager will truthfully report the magnitude of the sunk investment cost. Furthermore,
in line with the relevant literature, we nd that the mechanism is costly for the principal
(P (x; p1; p2) < P (x; p1; p2)) who has the contractual obligation to, i) pay a positive informa-
tion rent to the agent if p1 turns out to be the true input price, or, ii) wait until the ine¢ ciently
high investment threshold XR2 (p1; p2) is reached if p2 turns out to be the true input price.
Apparently however, the distorting e¤ects of the use of the bonus-incentive mechanism are
not limited to the principal. The inequality AR (x; p1; p2) < AM (x; p1; p2) suggests that,
even parties that are not involved in the downstream agency conict are a¤ected by it. In
our case for instance, the upstream rm A, who does not anticipate the investment thresh-
old XR2 (p1; p2) (> X
M
2 (p2)) su¤ers an ex-ante loss equal to AM (x; p1; p2)   AR (x; p1; p2),
which is directly reected in a reduced aggregate value of the opportunity to invest. It is im-
portant to stress here that this is actually a deadweight loss in the sense that the di¤erence
AM (x; p1; p2)   AR (x; p1; p2) is not funding a bonus-incentive mechanism as for instance
34Recall that from Eq. (25.2) we have B (x; p1; p2) < VB (x; I1; I2).
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is the case with the di¤erence P (x; p1; p2)   P (x; p1; p2). Consequently, when considering
the merits of supply chain transparency, one should keep in mind that by making the bonus-
incentive mechanism obsolete, supply chain transparency is not only beneting the principal,
but is e¤ectively dealing with the relevant negative externalities as well.
Given the comparison of the results presented in TABLE 6, lets now discuss the relevant
implications. Lets start with agent B. As already stated above, by denition, B possesses
a relevant expertise. For instance, s/he might be a professional manager with specialized
information related to the upstream rms production costs (Mookherjee and Tsumagari, 2004),
or s/he might be responsible for the solution of a matching problem if direct communication
between the project originator and the input supplier is impossible, or prohibitively expensive
(Faure-Grimaud and Martimort, 2001). In these two cases, the level of information sharing
among the principal P and the input supplier A depends exclusively on the willingness of the
intermediary B to ease communication between the two extreme links of the supply chain. Since
according to TABLE 6 the manager has nothing to gain from transparency in the supply chain,
one expects to nd an agent with these characteristics when studying non-transparent supply
chains.
Alternatively, B might just be the "person on the spot" (Hayek, 1945). In many cases,
the agents expertise has to do with nothing else but the intimate knowledge of the particular
circumstances of time and place. For instance, McAfee and McMillan (1995) assume that
the management of the project takes time and the principals time is limited, whereas Van
Zandt (1999) argues that delegation might stem from the xed information processing capacity
of the principal. In both cases, the information sharing between the input supplier and the
principal does not depend on the agents willingness to behave as a communication channel.
Consequently, one expects to nd agents behaving as "the person on the spot" when studying
supply chains characterized by traceability and transparency.
Last, note that an agent B who cannot prevent communication between the other two links
of the supply chain is a necessary but not su¢ cient condition for better coordination. In this
model I tacitly assume that all the supply chain partners possess the skills to process the shared
information costlessly but this is not necessarily true. In reality, companies might actually
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need to invest in developing capabilities to utilize the shared information in an e¤ective way.35
Similarly, information sharing can be constrained by antitrust regulations or by non-disclosure
agreements among some of the supply chain partners.
35Lets for instance go back to subsection 4.2.2. In that case I assume that the input supplier A shares
information with P who is beneted by the updated information endowment gaining the positive di¤erence
P (x; p1; p2)  P (x; p1; p2). Now, if P faces a positive information processing cost larger than this di¤erence,
s/he will never make use of the new information endowment and the supply chain will remain non-transparent
in spite of As actions.
Similarly, in subsection 4.2.3 I assume that P shares information related to process (1) with A who is beneted
by the updated information endowment gaining the positive di¤erence A (x;'1; '2) AM (x; p1; p2). If A faces
a positive information processing cost larger than this di¤erence, s/he will never make use of the new information
endowment and the supply chain will remain non-transparent in spite of Ps actions.
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4.4 Appendix
4.4.1 Information asymmetry and in-house production of the input
Under information asymmetry and in-house production of the discrete input, P needs to solve
the following problem:
max
f(XAI1 ;w1);(XAI2 ;w2)g

x
XAI1
  
XAI1   w1   I1

+
1  q
q

x
XAI2
  
XAI2   w2   I2

(A.1)
Subject to:

x
XAI1

w1 

x
XAI2

(w2 +I) (A.2)
x
XAI2

w2 

x
XAI1

(w1  I) (A.3)
w1  0 (A.4)
w2  0 (A.5)
q

x
XAI1

w1 + (1  q)

x
XAI2

w2  0 (A.6)
Working with constraints (A.2) and (A.5) we have:

x
XAI1

w1 

x
XAI2

(w2 +I) 

x
XAI2

I > 0
!
w1 > 0
Consequently, constraint (A.4) and constraint (A.6) are slack. This allows us to solve problem
(A.1) only subject to constraints (A.2), (A.3) and (A.5). Setting constraint (A.3) aside for now,
the Lagrangian is
L =

x
XAI1
  
XAI1   w1   I1

+
1  q
q

x
XAI2
  
XAI2   w2   I2

+1
"
x
XAI1

w1  

x
XAI2

(w2 +I)
#
(A.7)
+2w2;
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where 1 is the Lagrangian multiplier that corresponds to constraint (A.2) and 2 is the La-
grangian multiplier that corresponds to constraint (A.5).
Now, keeping in mind the complementary slackness conditions for the two constraints, we
can maximize the Lagrangian with respect to XAI1 ; X
AI
2 ; w1 and w2. The rst-order conditions
with respect to w1 and w2 give 1 = 1 and 2 =

1 q
q + 1

x
XAI2

> 0 respectively. This
means that both the incentive compatibility condition (A.2) and the limited liability condition
(A.5) are binding, i.e.,
w2 = 0 (A.8)
and
w1 =

XAI1
XAI2

I: (A.9)
Given these, the rst-order conditions with respect to the investment thresholds XAI1 and X
AI
2
result in:
XAI1 (I1) =

   1I1 (A.10)
XAI2 (I1; I2) =

   1

I2 +
q
1  qI

(A.11)
One can easily show that the derived solutions in Eq. (A.8)-(A.11) satisfy the constraint (A.3)
comprising the menu of contracts that P submits to A.
4.4.2 The investment cost as a continuous variable
In the main body of the paper I use a two-point distribution for the in-house production cost
I. Here I generalize allowing for a continuum of di¤erent levels of I in the interval [I1; I2]. Let
c(I) and C (I) be the density and the cumulative distribution of I respectively. The interval
[I1; I2] is the support and, consequently, C (I1) = 0 and C (I2) = 1. As in subsection 4.1 and
subsection 4.2 of the main body of the paper, I rst analyze the case with in-house production
of the input and then I consider the case with an external input supplier.
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Information symmetry and in-house production of the input under a continuous
distribution of I
Following the analysis of subsection 4.1.2 we know that when the agent has no informational
advantage over the principal, it is as if there is no delegation of the project. In this case, the
optimization problem that P needs to solve is given by
max
XCSI(I)
(Z I2
I1
 
XCSI (I)  I x
XCSI (I)

dC (I)
)
: (A.12)
Solving pointwise we obtain:
XCSI (I) =

   1I, for any I 2 [I1; I2] (A.13)
As expected, Eq. (A.13) is reminiscent of Eq. (4).36
Information asymmetry and in-house production of the input under a continuous
distribution of I
Following the analysis of subsection 4.1.3, I now examine the case where the true magnitude of
the investment cost is not common knowledge but is instead privately observed by the agent
B. As in subsection 4.1.3, the principal needs to design a menu of contracts contingent on
the observable component Xt. The only di¤erence with respect to the case that I examine
in subsection 4.1.3 is that here the menu is comprised, not by two, but by a continuum of
contracts, one for every I 2 [I1; I2]. The problem that P needs to solve is formulated as:
max
fXCAI(I);wCAI(I)g
(Z I2
I1
 
XCAI (I)  I   wCAI(I) x
XCAI (I)

dC(I)
)
(A.14)
36The letter C in the superscript stands for "continuum" whereas the letters SI stand for "symmetric
information".
78
Subject to:
wCAI(I)

x
XCAI (I)



wCAI(eI) + eI   I x
XCAI(eI)
!
(A.15)
wCAI(I)  0 (A.16)Z I2
I1
wCAI(I)

x
XCAI (I)

dC(I)  0, for any eI; I 2 [I1; I2] (A.17)
The objective function in problem (A.14) is the ex-ante option value of the principal.37 The
inequalities in (A.15) are the incentive compatibility constraints, the inequalities in (A.16)
are the limited liability conditions and inequality (A.17) is the agents ex-ante participation
condition. The term I stands for the true, whereas the term eI stands for the reported, level of
investment cost.
Following the analysis from subsection 4.4.1 of the Appendix and using similar arguments
we know that the constraint (A.17) is slack, whereas the constraint (A.16) gives wCAI(I2) = 0
and wCAI(I) > 0 for every I 2 [I1; I2). The problem that we need to solve is then reduced to:
max
fXCAI(I);wCAI(I)g
(Z I2
I1
 
XCAI (I)  I   wCAI(I) x
XCAI (I)

dC(I)
)
(A.14)
Subject to:
wCAI(I)

x
XCAI (I)



wCAI(eI) + eI   I x
XCAI(eI)
!
(A.15)
wCAI(I2) = 0, for any eI; I 2 [I1; I2] (A.18)
Lets now focus on the constraints in Ineq. (A.15). It is useful to recall that the information
rent is dened as wCAI(eI; I) = t(eI)   I;8eI, I 2 [I1; I2] where I is the true investment cost
and t(eI) is the money transfer from the principal to an agent who reports eI. Now, accord-
ing to Ineq. (A.15), the quantity (t (I)  I)

x
XCAI(I)

needs to be larger than any quantity
t(eI)  I x
XCAI(eI)

,eI 6= I. Lets now write this using the rst and the second order condi-
37The letter C in the superscript stands for "continuum" whereas the letters AI stand for "asymmetric
information".
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tions:
FOC and SOC Note rst that
@

t(eI)  I x
XCAI(eI)

@eI =
 
x
XCAI(eI)
!  
_t(eI)   t(eI)  I _XCAI(eI)
XCAI(eI)
!
; (A.19)
where @t(
eI)
@eI  _t(eI) and @XCAI(eI)@eI  _XCAI(eI). Now, given the rst-order derivative from Eq.
(A.19), the rst-order condition gives:
_t(I)   (t(I)  I)
_XCAI(I)
XCAI(I)
= 0 (A.20)
where @t(
eI)
@eI
eI=I = _t(I) and @XCAI(eI)@eI eI=I = _XCAI(I). The second-order derivative is:
@2

t(eI)  I x
XCAI(eI)

@eI2 = (A.21) 
x
XCAI(eI)
! 264  
_XCAI(eI)
XCAI(eI)

_t(eI)   t(eI)  I _XCAI(eI)
XCAI(eI)

+
t(eI)   _t(eI) _XCAI(eI)
XCAI(eI) +

t(eI)  I XCAI(eI)XCAI(eI)  _XCAI(eI)2
XCAI(eI)2

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From the second-order condition and keeping in mind Eq. (A.20) we have:
t(I)  
 
_t(I)
_XCAI(I)
XCAI(I)
+ (t(I)  I)
XCAI(I)XCAI(I)  _XCAI(I)2
XCAI(I)2
!
 0 (A.22)
Last, from the rst-order condition we have:
@

_t(I)   (t(I)  I) _XCAI(I)
XCAI(I)

@I
= 0 (A.23)
!
t(I)   _t(I)
_XCAI(I)
XCAI(I)
   (t(I)  I)
XCAI(I)XCAI(I)  _XCAI(I)2
XCAI(I)2
=  
_XCAI(I)
XCAI(I)
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From Ineq. (A.22) and Eq. (A.23) we obtain:
_XCAI(I)  0 (A.24)
This is a standard monotonicity constraint.38 Last, applying the envelope theorem we obtain:
@ (t(I)  I)

x
XCAI(I)

@I
=  

x
XCAI(I)

(A.25)
Rewriting the problem Using Ineq. (A.24) and Eq. (A.25) we can rewrite the problem in
the following way:
max
fXCAI(I);wCAI(I)g
(Z I2
I1
 
XCAI(I)  I   wCAI(I) x
XCAI(I)

dC(I)
)
(A.14)
Subject to:
_XCAI(I)  0 (A.24)
@ (t(I)  I)

x
XCAI(I)

@I
=  

x
XCAI(I)

(A.25)
wCAI(I2) = 0 (A.18)
Now, from Eq. (A.25) and Eq. (A.18) we have:
(t(I)  I)

x
XCAI(I)

=
Z I2
I

x
XCAI()

d (A.26a)
!
wCAI(I)

x
XCAI(I)

=
Z I2
I

x
XCAI()

d (A.26b)
Using Eq. (A.26), the objective function from problem (A.14) becomes:
Z I2
I1
"
XCAI(I)  I   C(I)
c(I)

x
XCAI(I)
#
dC(I) (A.27)
38See Chapter 2 from La¤ont and Martimort (2002) for more details. One can easily check that the monotonic-
ity holds also when I is a discrete random variable.
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Using this expression we can rewrite the problem as:
max
XCAI(I)
(Z I2
I1
"
XCAI(I)  I   C(I)
c(I)

x
XCAI (I)
#
dC(I)
)
(A.28)
subject to,
_XCAI(I)  0: (A.24)
Momentarily ignoring the monotonicity constraint (A.24), we solve the maximization problem
(A.28) pointwise and we obtain
XCAI(I) =

   1

I +
C(I)
c(I)

, for any I 2 [I1; I2] : (A.29)
From Eq. (A.29) we see that there is no timing distortion when the investment cost I takes its
minimum value (since C (I1) = 0), whereas there is an upward distortion for any I 2 (I1; I2].
Of course, the XCAI(I1) = XCSI(I1) and XCAI(I) > XCSI(I);8I 2 (I1; I2] are symmetric to
the XAI(I1) = XSI(I1) and XAI2 (I1; I2) > X
SI
2 (I2) that we derived in subsection 4.1.3 of the
main body of the paper.
The last thing that we need to check is under what conditions our solution respects the
monotonicity constraint (A.24). From Eq. (A.29) we have
_XCAI(I) =

   1

1 +
@
@I

C(I)
c(I)

:
The monotone hazard rate property @@I

C(I)
c(I)

 0 is a su¢ cient condition for _XCAI(I)  0
to hold. This condition is satised by most parametric single-peak densities (see Bagnoli and
Bergstrom, 2005).
Last, note that from Eq. (A.26) we can also derive the relevant information rent:
wCAI(I) =
Z I2
I

XCAI(I)
XCAI()

d, for any I 2 [I1; I2] (A.30)
In words, the menu of contracts designed by P is built in such a way that for any I 2 [I1; I2) a
positive information rent is to be paid. The information rent is equal to zero only when I takes
its maximum value (wCAI(I2) = 0). As one can notice, this is symmetric to w1 > 0 and w2 = 0
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from subsection 4.1.3 of the main body of the paper.
The presence of an upstream supplier
When an upstream supplier is responsible for the provision of the needed input, we can distin-
guish between two separate cases:
- If there is no information asymmetry downstream (subsection 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 of the main
body of the paper), no information rent is paid to the project manager.
Under traceability (subsection 4.2.2), the price of the input is derived as the solution of
max
pI
Z I2
I1
(pI   I)

x
XCM (pI)

dC(I); (A.31)
where XCM (pI) =

 1pI , for any I 2 [I1; I2]. Note that XCM (pI) is identical to XCSI(I) from
Eq. (A.13) if instead of I we use pI .39 Solving, we obtain
pI =

   1I, for any I 2 [I1; I2] : (A.32)
In this case, the value of the opportunity to invest for the principal P is equal to
P (x; p) =
Z I2
I1
 
XCM (pI)  pI
 x
XCM (pI)

dC(I), (A.33)
whereas the value of the opportunity to invest for the upstream rm A is equal to
AM (x; p) =
Z I2
I1
(pI   I)

x
XCM (pI)

dC(I).40 (A.34)
Under a transparent supply chain (subsection 4.2.3), that is when A observes continuously and
veriably the evolution of the stochastic term, the price of the input is derived as the solution
of
max
'I
Z I2
I1
('I   I)

x
XCSI (I)

dC(I); (A.35)
39The symmetry between XCM (pI) and XCSI(I) is reminiscent of the symmetry between XMi (pi) and X
SI
i
(see subsection 4.2.1 of the main body of the paper).
40The term p stands for the continuum of input prices that corresponds to the continuum of investment costs.
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subject to,  
XCSI(I)  'I
 x
XCSI(I)

 	I , for any I 2 [I1; I2] . (A.36)
Similarly to what we have in subsection 4.2.3 of the main body of the paper, the term 'I
stands for the price of the input and the term 	I is the chosen reservation value. Using similar
argumentation, we choose 	I =
 
XCM (pI)  pI
 
x
XCM (pI)

and solving we obtain:
'I =

   1I
 
1  (   1)
 1

!
, for any I 2 [I1; I2] . (A.37)
Finally, the value of the investment opportunity for the two parties is
P (x;') =
Z I2
I1
 
XCAI(I)  'I
 x
XCAI(I)

dC(I); (A.38)
and
A (x;') =
Z I2
I1
('I   I)

x
XCSI(I)

dC(I); (A.39)
for the principal and for the agent respectively.41 Last,
- If the supply chain is non-transparent (subsection 4.2.1 of the main body of the paper),
we can use Eq. (A.32) as the starting point and reapproach the problem (A.14)-(A.17) deriving
an updated menu of a continuum of contracts. Of course, this new menu of contracts will be
totally symmetric to the one that we derived in Eqs. (A.29)-(A.30) as the menu of contracts in
(19) is totally symmetric to the menu of contracts in (12).
41The term ' stands for the continuum of input prices that corresponds to the continuum of investment costs.
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Chapter 5
Synthesis of paper 3
Keeping in mind the current Common Agricultural Policy, I examine the case of a landholder
who is contemplating the opportunity to invest in order to convert a piece of idle land into
farmland. It is assumed that, once the land is converted, the farmer can switch between
two states: i) s/he can cultivate the land and sell the crop yield in the market whenever
active farming is protable, or ii) can suspend farming operations when active farming is not
protable, keeping however the option to restart active farming as soon as active farming turns
protable again. In the meantime and irrespective of the exact state, the farmer cashes a
periodic net income equivalent to the di¤erence between the direct payment that is conditional
on cross-compliance and the very cost of cross-compliance. The problem that the landholder
faces is twofold. Firstly, s/he must determine the level of capital intensity and, secondly, s/he
needs to set the timing of the investment taking into account that prots from agriculture are
random and that, consequently, holding the options to suspend and to restart farming gives
some operational exibility.1
5.1 The basic set-up
Consider a landholder contemplating the development of idle land. The underlying investment
problem involves the choice of timing of development and of capital intensity, i.e. the capital-
land ratio (see Capozza and Li, 1994). Assume that, without loss of generality, the targeted
1See for instance Capozza and Li (1994) for a similar treatment.
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land surface is normalized to 1 and denote by  2 (0; 1] the degree of capital intensity that
the landholder may select.2 The initial sunk investment cost, I(), associated with the project
takes the following functional form:
I() = k1 + k2, with k1  0 and k2 > 0, (1)
where k1 and k2 are dimensional parameters.3 The term k1 includes any xed cost associated
with the mere land conversion while the term k2 considers costs associated with a higher
capital-land ratio.
Note that the generic term landholder is used on purpose. S/he can be either a landowner
or a lessee. The only di¤erence is that, in the latter case, the term k1 contains both the cost
related to land conversion, as well as the rental price agreed with the landowner.
A periodic direct payment s  0 is made to the landholder conditional on having land sat-
isfying the cross-compliance requirements dened by the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).
The periodic compliance cost is assumed to be equal to m 2 [0; s].4 Hence, once accounted for
this cost, the net periodic payment accruing to the landholder is p = s m  0.5
Once invested in a land development project characterized by a generic capital intensity
level , the following two post-investment scenarios may occur:
- active farming: the land is cultivated and the yield is assumed to be increasing and
concave in . The amount of commodity produced is given by the following function:
q() = = with  2 (0; 1) (2)
The unit production cost is, by assumption, constant and equal to c > 0 while the unit market
price for the commodity produced, xt, is stochastic and uctuates according to the following
2Note that, at no loss of generality, the frame is normalized by setting the maximum intensity level equal to
1.
3Note that one may allow for a more general functional form such as I() = k1 + k2 
!
!
; with !  1. This
would, however, have no impact on the quality of our results.
4 I abstract from the consideration of land maintenance that the farmer may, irrespective of the decoupled
payment, consider optimal to undertake. In other words, I assume that no free meals are provided to the farmers.
5 I implicitly assume that if s < m applying for the payment would make no sense as the corresponding net
payment would be negative, i.e. p < 0.
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geometric Brownian motion:
dxt=xt = dt+ dLt with x0 = x (3)
where  is the drift parameter,  > 0 is the instantaneous volatility of the market price and
dLt is the standard increment of a Wiener process.6
Summing up, since a rational landholder is expected to maintain her/his land according to
the cross-compliance requirements (p  0), the periodic total prots for an active farmer are
equal to
at (xt; ) + p,
where at (xt; ) = q()(xt   c).
- passive farming: the land is not cultivated but may still qualify for direct support.
Assuming again that the farmer fullls all the cross-compliance requirements, the periodic total
prots for a passive farmer would then be equal to p.
As one may immediately see when comparing the payo¤s associated with the two scenarios,
active farming is protable when xt > c. Otherwise, that is when xt  c; the farmer should opt
for passive farming. Hence, at each time point the prot ow associated with the investment
project is as follows:
t =
8<: at (xt; ) + p; for xt > cp; for xt  c (4)
Note that the active farmer may be viewed as holding the option to suspend farm operations
whenever farming is not protable, i.e. xt  c. This option is clearly valuable as a positive
payo¤ is associated with passive farming. Similarly, a passive farmer may be viewed as holding
the option to restart farm operations as soon as farming becomes protable, i.e. xt > c. Also
in this case, as the corresponding payo¤, once the option is exercised, is positive, a positive
value is associated with this option. In the following, I will assume for simplicity that switching
from active to passive farming and vice versa is costless.7 Last, again for the sake of simplicity,
6Note that this frame may be easily extended to the consideration of several farm outputs and prices.
7With switching costs, conclusions do not change qualitatively. We simply have a larger hysteresis area in
the sense that the farmer waits a bit more before switching from active to passive farming and vice versa. A
complete analysis of the case where costs are associated with suspending and restarting a project is presented in
87
I assume that i) once invested, the project runs forever8 and ii) the capital installed does not
"rust" i.e., no maintenance is required.9 Finally, I assume that the farmer is risk neutral and
discounts future payo¤s using the interest rate r > .10
5.2 The farms operating value
Let V (xt;) represent the farms operating value upon investment. Solving the underlying
dynamic programming problem yields:11
V (xt;) =
8<: eAx
2
t + q()(
xt
r    cr ) + pr for xt > ceBx1t + pr for xt  c (5)
for any  2 (0; 1],
where 2 < 0 and 1 > 1 are the roots of the characteristic equation ()  (1=2)2(  1)+
   r and
eA = q()A = 

r   1
(1   2)r(r   )
c1 2 , (5.1)
eB = q()B = 

r   2
(1   2)r(r   )
c1 1 . (5.2)
The terms eAx2t and eBx1t in Eq. (5) represent the value associated with the options to suspend
and restart farm operations, respectively. Note that the constants, eA and eB, are both non-
negative, increasing and concave in the capital intensity .12 This makes sense considering that
the value associated with both options depends on the productive capacity q() associated with
the adopted capital intensity.
In Eq. (5) we observe that for xt > c, i.e. under active farming, the operating value of
Dixit and Pindyck (1994, chap. 7).
8Note that this assumption does not a¤ect at all the quality of our results.
9The case where costs are associated with the maintainance of a project is presented in Dixit and Pindyck
(1994, chap. 7).
10This restriction is needed in order to ensure convergence. See Dixit and Pindyck (1994, pp. 138). Note
that in order to use an interest rate incorporating a proper risk adjustment, expectations should be taken with
respect to a distribution of xt adjusted for risk neutrality. See Cox and Ross (1976) for further details.
11See subsection 5.6.1 in Appendix A.
12On the value of the options to switch, see Dixit and Pindyck (1994, pp. 188-189).
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the farm is given by the sum of the value of the option to switch to passive farming (that is,
to suspend farm operations), eAx2t , plus the net present value associated with active farming,
q()( xtr    cr ), and the present value of the ow of net direct payments, pr . Note that the value
of the option to switch to passive farming is decreasing in the price level xt and increasing in
the production cost c. This makes sense considering that this option becomes more valuable
if prots from active farming decrease. On the other branch of the value function, that is for
xt  c, i.e. under passive farming, the value of the farm is given by the sum of the value of
the option to switch from passive to active farming (that is to restart farm operations), eBx1t ,
plus the present value of the ow of net direct payments, pr . Note that the value of this option
is increasing in the price level xt and decreasing in the production cost c. This makes sense
considering that the option to restart farming operations becomes more valuable when prots
associated with active farming are higher.
5.3 The optimal capital intensity
In this subsection I determine the optimal capital intensity level that the landholder should
adopt when setting up the farm. This level must be chosen taking into account i) the future
potential evolution of farming prots and ii) the operational exibility associated with the
options to switch between passive and active farming and vice versa. As one can see, these two
aspects are clearly interrelated as the acquired exibility allows hedging against the volatility
that, via the market price, may a¤ect farming prots.
Production and operational exibility are increasing in capital intensity but do not come
for free. The corresponding benets must in fact be traded o¤ with an investment cost that is
increasing in the capital intensity level as well. In the following, I determine the optimal capital
intensity only for the scenario where investment in land development occurs when active farming
is protable, i.e., for xt > c.13
When xt > c, the farmland is immediately used for production of agricultural commodities.
The optimal level of capital intensity, , should be such that the expected net present value
13A scenario where the landholder contemplates investment in land development when active farming is not
protable, i.e. xt  c; seems less realistic. However, the relative analysis is provided in Appendix B (subsection
5.7).
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associated with the current and future farm operations is maximized, i.e.:
 = argmaxNPV a(xt; ), s.t. 0 <   1, (6)
where,
NPV a(xt; ) = V (xt; )  I() = eAx2t + q()( xtr      cr ) + pr   (k1 + k2) . (6.1)
The solution of problem (6) leads to the following proposition
Proposition 16 Provided that 	 = k2   Bc1 > 0, the optimal intensity level when investing
at xt > c is
(xt) =
8<: (O(xt)=k2)
1
1  for c < xt < x
1 for x  xt
, (7)
where O(xt) = Ax
2
t +
xt
r    cr , and x is such that O(x) = k2.
Proof. See subsection 5.6.2 in Appendix A.
One can show that the optimal capital intensity (xt) is increasing in xt in the interval
c < xt < x. This property results from the sum of two opposing forces within the term O(xt).
First, as xt increases, due to the higher expected prots per unit of production, i.e., xtr   cr , the
landholder would prefer to invest in a higher (xt) so that s/he can produce more.14 Second,
(xt) is increasing in the value, per unit of production, of the option to switch to passive
farming, i.e., Ax2t . This makes sense considering that a higher Ax
2
t secures a higher hedge
against the volatility of farming prots. In this respect, the value associated with the option to
switch to passive farming, Ax2t , is decreasing in xt as, the higher the xt, the less likely is the
future switching to passive farming.
It is worth discussing the nature of the condition set on 	 in Proposition 16.15 The term
	 represents the net marginal cost of capital intensity  = 1. In particular, it is given by the
di¤erence between the marginal investment cost, k2, and the marginal value of the option to
14Note that the volume of produced commodity, q(), is increasing in capital intensity as well.
15 In Appendix A (subsection 5.6.2) I also consider the scenario where 	 = k2   Bc1  0 and I show that,
when this is the case, (xt) is equal to 1 for any xt > c. Note that the analysis of the investment decision under
this scenario is similar to the one provided for 	 > 0 and (xt) = 1 under xt  x.
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switch to active farming, Bx1t , evaluated at the boundary price xt = c. Note that if at this
price level, the marginal benet, Bc1 , is higher than the marginal cost, k2, associated with
investing in the highest feasible capital intensity, adopting a lower capital intensity, i.e.  < 1;
is optimal. The capital intensity will then increase with xt and be equal to 1 only when a
commodity price su¢ ciently high is considered i.e., xt  x.
Last, plugging Eq. (7) in Eq. (6.1) yields:
NPV a(xt; (xt)) =
8<: (
O(xt)
k2
)
1
1 

1
   1

k2 +
p
r   k1 for c < xt < x
O(xt)
 +
p
r   (k1 + k2) for x  xt
(8)
5.4 Value and timing of the investment
Lets now determine the value of the opportunity to invest in the land development project, as
well as the optimal investment timing.
Denote by bx the price threshold triggering investment. Assuming that the initial market
price x is su¢ ciently small so that investing at time zero is not preferable (i.e. x < bx), the
value of the opportunity to invest is
F (x; bx) = max

E0
 
e rNPV a(bx) , (9)
where the time of investment,  , is a random variable dened as  = infft  0 j xt = bxg and
E0 is the corresponding conditional expectation.16
Eq. (9) can be rearranged as follows:17
F (x; bx) = maxbx f(x=bx)1NPV a(bx)g (9.1)
16Of course if x  bx our problem reduces to a standard net present value maximization since the potential
investor decides to exercise the option to invest as soon as possible.
17See Dixit and Pindyck (1994, pp. 315-316) for the calculation of this expected present value.
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From the rst-order condition of Problem (9.1) we get:18
bx = 1NPV a(bx)@NPV a(bx)
@bx (10)
Lets now consider the two investment scenarios proposed in subsection 5.3, namely, the scenario
where  = 1 and the scenario where  < 1.
Case  = 1 - The landholder is contemplating investing in a project characterized by
the highest possible capital intensity,  = 1. As shown above, this is the case whenever the
commodity price is higher than x. In the Appendix, I show that:
Proposition 17 Provided that pr < k1+k2 and
x
r   cr  , the optimal investment threshold,
x, for a project with capital intensity  = 1 is the solution of the following equation:
x +
1   2
1   1
Ax2(r   )  xn = 0, (11)
where  =
c
r
+k22 1[k2(1 )+( pr k1)]
2 1 and x
n = 11 1(r   )f
c
r   [pr   (k1 + k2)]g, while the
value of the opportunity to invest in the project is:
F (x; x) = [
O(x)

+
p
r
  (k1 + k2)]( x
x
)1 (12)
Otherwise, i.e. if pr  k1 + k2 and xr    cr  , the landholder should invest immediately.
Proof. See subsection 5.6.3 in Appendix A.
Proposition 17 presents two potential investment scenarios, namely, a scenario where the
present value of the ow of net payments, pr , is lower than the investment cost, I(1) = k1 + k2,
and the scenario where this cost is equal or higher than pr . We observe that when
p
r < k1 + k2
the investment in a land development project with capital intensity (x) = 1 is conditional on
having at x = x an expected protability, xr    cr , associated with active farming higher than
the level . Otherwise, the project is not worth investing in. Note that the term xn in Eq. (11)
is equivalent to the investment threshold for the case where the options to switch between active
18See subsection 5.6.3 in Appendix A for the derivation of Eq. (10). An exhaustive discussion of the underlying
solution concept is provided by Dixit et al. (1999).
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and passive farming are not present, i.e. A = 0. As one can see x < xn. This implies that the
presence of these options, by providing a hedge against prot volatility, induces, in expected
terms, an earlier investment. In contrast, without this hedge, prot volatility would induce a
delayed investment. Investment should in fact occur at a price level at which the likelihood of
a fall in the prot associated with active farming is su¢ ciently low. Finally, when the present
value of the ow of net payments, pr , is equal or higher than the investment cost, k1 + k2,
the concern about investing at a price level high enough to take into account the investment
cost and the lost option value is absent and the landholder should invest immediately. This
is, of course, not surprising considering that the investment cost is covered by the net direct
payments and that the farmer is eager to cash the amount pr   (k1 + k2)  0.
Case  < 1 - Lets now turn to a scenario characterized by a commodity price lying in the
region (c; x). Within this region, the landholder contemplates investing in a land development
project characterized by capital intensity  < 1. In the Appendix is shown that:
Proposition 18 Provided that pr < k1 + k2(c) and
x
r    cr < , the optimal investment
threshold, x, for a project with capital intensity  < 1 is the solution of
x
@(x)
@x
  1((x) +

1  
p
r   k1
k2
) = 0; (13)
while the value of the opportunity to invest in the project is:
F (x; x) = [(
O(x)
k2
)
1
1  (
1

  1)k2 + p
r
  k1]( x
x
)1 (14)
Otherwise, i.e. if pr  k1 + k2(c) and xr    cr < , the landholder should invest immediately
in a land development project characterized by the minimum capital intensity, i.e. (c).
Proof. See subsection 5.6.3 in Appendix A.
Similarly to the case where (x) = 1; also here we have two potential investment scenarios.
The main di¤erence is that now the two scenarios are dened on the basis of the investment
cost associated with a land development project characterized by the minimum capital intensity
(c), i.e. I((c)) = k1+k2(c). When this cost is not covered by the present value of the ow of
net payments, pr , the realization of the project is conditional on having at x
 = x an expected
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protability, xr   cr , associated with active farming lower than the level. Otherwise, investing
in a land development project with capital intensity (x) < 1 would not make sense as the
landholder should rather consider investing in a project with full capital intensity. Investment
must occur when the price level x is reached and the farmer must adopt a capital intensity
(x) < 1. In contrast, when pr  k1 + k2(c), the farmer should rush and invest immediately
in a project with the lowest possible capital intensity, i.e., (c): Similarly to the case above,
also in this case, as the investment cost is fully covered, the farmer rushes as s/he is eager to
cash the net gain pr   (k1 + k2(c))  0.
5.5 The e¤ect of the policy instrument
In this subsection, I study the impact that di¤erent levels of the net direct payment p = s m
may have on the timing of the investment, the adopted capital intensity and the value of the
investment opportunity.
Lets start by considering the limit case where p = 0. This holds either when s = m =
0 or when s = m > 0. There is an important distinction to be made between these two
cases. Under s = m = 0, we are basically dealing with a CAP that is not setting any cross-
compliance requirements (m = 0) and, consequently, is not paying any decoupled payments
(s = 0). In this case, the landholder/potential investor that is contemplating entering the
farming business, knows that s/he can count on positive farming prots only when the prices
of the agricultural commodities are high enough. On the contrary, s/he anticipates that during
the periods when the prices of the agricultural commodities are too low, s/he will have no cash
ows whatsoever. During these periods s/he will just be, voluntarily, undertaking the minimum
level of maintenance that will allow her/him to re-enter the farming business once this becomes
a protable alternative. This however, is just part of a farmers routine and should not be
attributed to the CAP.
The case under which s = m > 0 seems more interesting. According to the current CAP,
todays generation of farmers is supposed to combine the roles of farmer and steward of the
countryside and, consequently, a positive cross-compliance cost is to be expected.19 Under
19See e.g. http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/50-years-of-cap/les/history/history_book_lr_en.pdf and
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m > 0, the level of net decoupled payments is equal to zero (p = 0) only if the direct payment
(s) is chosen to be exactly equal to the maintenance cost (m). This, of course, is technically
demanding because of the relevant information asymmetries between the policy maker (CAP)
and the policy taker (EU farmers). However, it clearly shows that the decoupled payments are
nancially neutral when optimally calibrated. In other words, passive farming support could
ideally guarantee a minimum of maintenance of the EU farmland without any unnecessary
money transfers. This argument proves that, if there are any aws in passive farming support,
they lie in the implementation rather than the nature of the policy.
Lets now focus on the case where positive policy rents (p > 0) may be cashed. Assuming
that the policy is not purposefully providing unconditional money transfers, a positive net
decoupled payment implies a payment s that is not correctly calibrated to be in line with
the actual cost of cross-compliance m. This may very well be the case in reality considering,
as underlined above, the presence of asymmetric information related to the actual cost of
compliance.
Note rst that a change in p(> 0), even if not a¤ecting the threshold x delimiting the choice
of capital intensity  = 1 rather than capital intensity  < 1, a¤ects the magnitude of the term
: In particular, a higher p, by increasing , makes higher the level of protability required
in order to consider only land development projects with capital intensity  = 1. Additionally,
a change in p is also a¤ecting the necessary conditions pr < k1 + k2 and
p
r < k1 + k2(c) from
Proposition 17 and Proposition 18 respectively. Nevertheless, and unless the policy is terribly
miscalibrated, a change in p is expected to violate neither the rst nor the second.
As far as the two investment thresholds are concerned, in subsection 5.6.3 of Appendix A
it is shown that:
Proposition 19 A landholder who contemplates investing in the development of idle land will,
in expected terms and irrespective of the capital intensity chosen, hasten the investment decision
as the net direct payment p increases since, @x

@p < 0 and
@x
@p < 0.
As one can see from Proposition 19, compensating passive farmers fosters, rather than deters,
http://www2.jordbruksverket.se/webdav/les/SJV/trycksaker/Pdf_rapporter/ra11_5eng.pdf
According to the latter, the average cost of compliance in Sweden in 2011 was reported to be SEK 86 per
hectare of agricultural land though for some farms this cost was signicantly higher.
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land development, at least in terms of timing. The intuition behind this result is as follows.
Instead of seeing p as a cash ow that accrues over time, one can interpret the present value of
the ow of the net direct payments, pr , as an investment subsidy that is basically decreasing the
sunk cost of the investment. Now, using some standard option valuation arguments, we know
that a rm stands to gain more by exercising, rather than holding, an investment option with
a low strike price. In this framework, the rm is the landholder, the investment option is the
land development project and the strike price is exactly the sunk investment cost. Of course,
a positive periodic payment p decreases this sunk investment cost by pr favoring the exercise
of the investment option which, in this case, is the entrance of the landholder in the farming
business.
Further, focusing on the scenario where the price level is such that it is optimal investing
in a project with capital intensity  < 1, one can show that:
Proposition 20 When investing in the region (c; x), the chosen partial capital intensity is
decreasing in the net direct payment p.
As discussed in subsection 5.3,  is increasing in xt within the interval (c; x). In other words,
when investing in a project characterized by partial capital intensity, the potential acceleration
of the investment would imply a project of smaller magnitude. Hence, as by Proposition 19 we
have @x=@p < 0, then @(x)=@p < 0. This result implies that positive net direct payments
induce not only earlier investment but, at the same time, investment in land development
projects with lower capital intensity. Note however that since the productive capacity (q())
is increasing in capital intensity (), individual farms produce less output and, by doing so,
the potential excess output (and the need to manage it) is more limited. This is of course in
line with the CAPs intentions, as described in the Introduction, that eventually lead to the
decoupling of payments from production.
Last, the comparative statics concerning the impact on the value of the opportunity to
invest in a land development project reveal that:
Proposition 21 The value of the opportunity to invest in the development of idle land is,
irrespective of the capital intensity chosen, favored by an increase in the net direct payment p.
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Keeping in mind that x and x satisfy Eq. (10), we can use the envelope theorem and
derive
@F (xi)
@p
=
1
r
 x
xi
1
> 0, (15)
where xi 2 fx; xg.
In words, an increase in the net decoupled payment p as a source of income that is not
exposed to the market price volatility, increases the value of the opportunity to invest in a
land development project. The underlying mechanism is as follows. An increase in p is, as
outlined above, reected in a lower sunk investment cost and, through that, in a higher NPV.20
However, the e¤ect of p on F is corrected by the discount factor
 
x
xi
1 < 1. In words, the
landholder will reap the benets of a higher p only as soon as s/he decides to enter the farming
business and not before that. Note that unless we explicitly take into consideration the option
of the potential investor to postpone her/his investment decision for some future time point, the
discount factor
 
x
xi
1 will not appear in the calculations. This will be the case if instead of the
real options approach we use the standard NPV rule considering the landholders investment
decision a "now or never" problem.
20This is obvious from Eq. (8).
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5.6 Appendix A
5.6.1 The farms operating value
The farms operating value, V (xt;), is the solution of the following di¤erential equations:
 V H(xt;) =   [q()(xt   c) + p] for xt > c
 V L(xt;) =  p for xt  c
(A.1.1-A.1.2)
where   is the di¤erential operator:   =  r + xt @@xt + 122x2t @
2
@x2t
, V H is the farm operating
value under xt > c and V L is the farm operating value under xt  c.
Taking into account the boundary conditions
lim
xt!1
fV H(xt;)  [q()( xtr    cr ) + pr ]g = 0 for xt > c
lim
xt!0

V L(xt;)  pr
	
= 0 for xt  c
;
the general solution to the di¤erential Eqs. (A.1.1) and (A.1.2) takes the form:
V H(xt;) = eAx2t + q()( xtr    cr ) + pr for xt > c
V L(xt;) = eBx1t + pr for xt  c
At xt = c, standard optimality conditions, i.e. the value matching and smooth pasting condi-
tions, require that eAc2 +  ( cr    cr ) + pr = eBc1 + pr ,eA2c2 1 +  1r  = eB1c1 1, (A.1.3)
where 2 < 0 and 1 > 1 are the roots of the characteristic equation ()  122( 1)+ r.
Solving, the system (A.1.3) yields:
eA = q()A = 

r   1
(1   2) r(r   )
c1 2 > 0, (A.1.4)
eB = q()B = 

r   2
(1   2) r(r   )
c1 1 = eAr   2
r   1
c2 1 > 0. (A.1.5)
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5.6.2 Optimal capital intensity
Suppose that xt > c. The optimal capital intensity, should then be given by the solution of
 = argmaxf eAx2t + q()( xtr      cr ) + pr   I()g
= argmaxf


O(xt) +
p
r
  (k1 + k2)g (A.2.1)
where O(xt) = Ax
2
t +
xt
r    cr .
The rst-order condition for Problem (A.2.1) yields,21
 = (O(xt)=k2)
1
1  . (A.2.2)
Note that, to be feasible,  must be higher than 0 but not higher than 1, i.e.  2 (0; 1]. This
implies that the following condition must hold:
0 < O(xt)  k2
Note that:
O(c) =
r   2
(1   2)r(r   )
c = Bc1 > 0; O0(c) =
r   2
(1   2)r(r   )
1 > 0,
lim
xt!0
O(xt) ! 1
Hence, by the convexity of O(xt), it follows that O(xt) > 0 and O0(xt) > 0 for any xt > c.
Lets now check under which conditions O(xt)  k2; i.e.   1. Dene the function:
	 = k2  O(c) = k2  Bc1
In the light of the properties of O(xt), one may distinguish two scenarios:
21Note that the second-order condition for Problem (A.2.1) is always satised.
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Scenario A if 	 > 0! x > c;
(xt) =
8<: (O(xt)=k2)
1
1  for c < xt < x
1 for x  xt
;
where x (> c) is such that O(x) = k2. Note also that O0(x) > 0.
Scenario B if 	  0! x  c;
(xt) = 1; for xt > c.
5.6.3 Investing in land development
Once the optimal intensity level is set, one can determine the net present value corresponding
to the land development project by substituting (xt) into the function
NPV (xt;) = V (xt;)  I(): (A.3.1)
Taking into account the potential scenarios identied above, we get:
Scenario A when 	 > 0! x > c;
NPV a(xt; (xt)) =
8<: (
O(xt)
k2
)
1
1 

1
   1

k2 +
p
r   k1 for c < xt < x
O(xt)
 +
p
r   (k1 + k2) for x  xt
(A.3.2)
Scenario B when 	  0! x  c;
NPV a(xt; (xt)) =
O(xt)
 +
p
r   (k1 + k2) for c < xt (A.3.3)
Denote by bx the optimal investment threshold. Hence, using standard arguments, in the
continuation region x < bx the value of the opportunity to invest in the land development project
is given by the following function:
F (x; bx) = max

E0
 
e rNPV (bx) , (A.3.4)
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where  = infft  0 j xt = bxg is the (random) rst time that the process xt hits the barrierbx and E0 is the expectation taken at the initial time point t = 0.
As one can easily show, Eq. (A.3.4) is equivalent to22
F (x; bx) = maxbx f(x=bx)1NPV a(bx)g: (A.3.5)
Following Dixit et al. (1999), optimality requires that the following rst-order condition holds:
@[(x=bx)1NPV a(bx)]
@bx = (x=bx)1 @NPV a(bx)@bx +NPV a(bx)@(x=bx)1@bx = 0. (A.3.6)
Rearranging Eq. (A.3.6), bx = 1NPV a(bx)@NPV a(bx)
@bx : (A.3.7)
Last, for Problem (A.3.5) to be well-posed, the following condition must hold at bx:
@2[(x=bx)1NPV a(bx)]
@x2

x=bx >
@2NPV a(x)
@x2

x=bx
!
@NPV a(bx)
@bx > bx1   1  @
2NPV a(x)
@x2

x=bx (A.3.8)
Investment under scenario A
Case  = 1 - Lets consider the interval where the land development project is characterized
by the highest possible capital intensity, i.e.  = 1. Denote by x the optimal investment
threshold. Substituting the second branch of Eq. (A.3.2) into Eq. (A.3.7) and rearranging, we
nd that xcan be determined by solving the following equation:
x +
1   2
1   1
Ax2(r   )  1
1   1
(r   )f c
r
  [p
r
  (k1 + k2)]g = 0 (A.3.9)
Existence and uniqueness of x - Dene the function
(x) = x+
1   2
1   1
Ax2(r   )  1
1   1
(r   )f c
r
  [p
r
  (k1 + k2)]g:
22See Dixit and Pindyck (1994, pp. 315-316) for the calculation of the expected present value in Eq. (A.3.4).
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Note that (x) is convex in x. Hence, the equation (x) = 0 may admit up to two roots.
However, note that by condition (A.3.8)
@NPV a(x)
@x
>
x
1   1
 @
2NPV a(x)
@x2

x=x
!
O0(x) >
x
1   1
O00(x)
!
0(x) = 1 + 2
1   2
1   1
Ax2 1(r   ) > 0. (A.3.8a)
This implies that if a solution x exists, then it is unique since 0(x) > 0.23 Hence, by the
convexity of (x); a necessary condition for the existence of a solution x to the investment
timing problem is:24
(c) =
1
1   1
[
p
r
  (k1 + k2)](r   ) < 0 (A.3.10)
Note that otherwise, i.e. for (c)  0, the potential investor should invest immediately. This
should, not surprisingly, occur when the present value of the ow of net payments, pr , is equal
or higher than the investment cost, k1 + k2.
Last, provided that condition (A.3.10) holds, we need to check for  = 1, that is, x  x.
This leads to the following necessary condition:
(x)  0! x
r     
c
r
  =
c
r + k22   1

k2(1  ) + 
 p
r   k1

2   1
Policy impact on the investment timing - Di¤erentiating Eq. (A.3.9) with respect to p
yields
@x
@p
=  

r1
1 1
r  + 2(1   2)Ax2 1
(A.3.11)
Note that, as by condition (A.3.8a) the denominator is strictly positive, we may conclude that
@x=@p < 0.
CASE  < 1 - Lets consider the interval (c; x) where, as shown in Eq. (A.3.2), the land
23Note also that 0(c) = 0.
24Recall that, as we saw in Eq. (A.3.2), the interval of interest is c < x  x.
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development project is characterized by a capital intensity lower than 1. Denote by x the
optimal investment threshold. Substituting the rst branch of Eq. (A.3.2) into Eq. (A.3.7) and
rearranging, we nd that x can be determined by solving the following equation:
x
@(x)
@x
  1(x) 

1  
p
r   k1
k2
1 = 0 (A.3.12)
Existence and uniqueness of x- Dene the function
(x) = x
@(x)
@x
  1(x) 

1  
p
r   k1
k2
1.
First and second order derivatives with respect to x are as follows
0(x) = x
@2(x)
@x2
  (1   1)
@(x)
@x
,
00(x) = x
@3(x)
@x3
  (1   2)
@2(x)
@x2
.
Note that in the considered interval, we have
@(x)
@x
=
@(O(x))
@O(x)
@O(x)
@x
> 0,
@2(x)
@x2
=
@(O(x))
@O(x)
@2O(x)
@x2
> 0,
@3(x)
@x3
=
@(O(x))
@O(x)
@3O(x)
@x3
< 0.
Hence, as
00(x) =
@(O(x))
@O(x)
2(2   1)(2   1)A2 2 < 0
we may conclude that (x) is concave in x. This implies that the equation (x) = 0 may
admit up to two roots. Note however that by condition (A.3.8):
@NPV (x)
@x
>
x
1   1
@2NPV a(x)
@x2

x=x
!
0(x) = x
@2(x)
@x2

x=x
  (1   1)
@(x)
@x

x=x
< 0 (A.3.8b)
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which in turn implies that the only root to be considered is the one where 0(x) < 0.
Lets now identify the conditions under which  < 1, that is, c < x < x. First, note that
0(c) = 0. By the concavity of (x) and knowing that 0(x) < 0, a necessary condition for
the existence of a solution x to the investment timing problem requires:
(c) =  1

1  
1
k2
[
p
r
  (k1 + k2(c))] > 0 (A.3.13)
Note that otherwise, i.e. if (c)  0, the landholder should invest immediately in a land
development project with capital intensity (c). This should, not surprisingly, occur when
the present value of the ow of net payments, pr , is equal or higher than the investment cost
associated with capital intensity (c), i.e. I((c)) = k1 + k2(c).
Last, provided that condition (A.3.13) holds, one must check that x < x. This leads to
the following necessary condition:
(x) < 0! x
r     
c
r
<  =
c
r + k22   1

k2(1  ) + 
 p
r   k1

2   1
Policy impact on investment timing - Di¤erentiating Eq. (A.3.12) with respect to p
yields
@x
@p
=

r1
(1  ) k2[x @2(x)@x2

x=x
  (1   1) @(x)@x

x=x
]
: (A.3.14)
Note that, as by condition (A.3.8b) the denominator is strictly negative, we may conclude that
@x=@p < 0.
Policy impact on capital intensity - Di¤erentiating (x) with respect to p yields
@(x)
@p
=
(x)
1  
O0(x)
O(x)
@x
@p
< 0:
Investment under scenario B
When 	  0; the landholder would always invest in a land development project characterized
by the highest possible capital intensity, i.e.,  = 1. The analysis of the investment timing is
identical to the one provided above for the corresponding case in Scenario A.
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5.7 Appendix B
Here I provide the analysis relative to the case where xt  c, that is, the region where the
commodity price is lower than the unit cost of production. In this region a landholder, once
invested in order to develop her/his land, would manage it passively cashing periodically the
net payment p while holding the option to switch to active farming which is worth, as discussed
above, eBx1t .
5.7.1 Optimal capital intensity
Suppose that xt  c. The optimal capital intensity level, , should then be given by the solution
of the following problem:
 = argmaxf eBx1t + pr   (k1 + k2)g
= argmaxf


Bx
1
t +
p
r
  (k1 + k2)g (B.1.1)
The rst-order condition for Problem (B.1.1) yields,25
 = (Bx
1
t =k2)
1
1  . (B.1.2)
Thanks to the positivity of xt,26  > 0 for any xt  c. One must however secure that   1,
which implies:
Bx
1
t  k2
By the monotonicity of Bx1t in xt, the solution of the equation Bx
1
t = k2 is unique and equal
to x = (k2=B)1=1 > 0. We may now distinguish two potential scenarios:
Scenario C if 	 = k2  Bc1  0! x  c and
(xt) =
8<: (Bx
1
t =k2)
1
1  for 0 < xt < x
1 for x  xt  c
25Note that the second-order condition for Problem (B.1.1) is always satised.
26Recall that xt is log-normally distributed. See e.g. Chapter 3 in Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
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Scenario D if 	 > 0! x > c and
(xt) = (Bx
1
t =k2)
1
1  for 0 < xt  c
5.7.2 Investing in land development
Once the optimal intensity level is set, we can determine the net present value corresponding
to the land development project by substituting (xt) into Eq. (A.3.1). This yields:
Scenario C when 	  0,
NPV p(xt; (xt)) =
8<: ( 1   1)(
Bx
1
t
k2
)
1
1  k2 +
p
r   k1 for 0 < xt < x
Bx
1
t
 +
p
r   (k1 + k2) for x  xt  c
(B.2.1)
Scenario D when 	 > 0,
NPV p(xt; (xt)) =
Bx
1
t
 +
p
r   (k1 + k2) for 0 < xt  c (B.2.2)
Investing under scenario C
CASE  = 1 - Lets consider the interval where  = 1, i.e., [x; c]. Denote by ex the optimal
investment threshold. Hence, using standard arguments, in the continuation region, x < ex;
the value of the opportunity to invest in the land development project is given by the following
function:
F (x; ex) = maxex f(x=ex)1 [Bex1 + pr   (k1 + k2)]g (B.2.3)
Taking the rst derivative of the objective with respect to ex we get:
@(x=ex)1NPV p(ex)
@ex =  1ex ( xex )1 [pr   (k1 + k2)] (B.2.4)
As one can see, the sign of the rst derivative depends on the term pr   (k1+k2). Two potential
scenarios arise:
(i) if pr < (k1 + k2)! @(x=ex)1NPV p(ex)@ex > 0: the landholder should postpone investing in land
development up to x = c and undertake the investment only if NPV p(c)  0.
106
(ii) if pr  (k1+ k2)! @(x=ex)1NPV p(ex)@ex  0 : the landholder should invest immediately as the
investment cost, k1 + k2; is lower than, or at most equal to, the present value of the ow
of net payments pr .
CASE  < 1 - Lets now consider the interval (0; x) where  < 1. Denote by ex the optimal
development threshold. In the continuation region, x < ex; the value of the opportunity to
invest in the land development project is given by the following function:
F (x; ex) = maxex f(x=ex)1 [( 1   1)(Bex1k2 ) 11  k2 + pr   k1)]g (B.2.5)
Taking the rst derivative of the objective with respect to ex we obtain:
@(x=ex)1NPV p(ex)
@ex =   1ex ( xex )1 [pr   (k1 + k2(ex))]
As one can see, the sign of the rst derivative depends on the term pr   (k1+ k2(ex)). Under
k1 <
p
r < k1 + k2, the interior solution is equal to
ex = [(k2
B
)(
p
r   k1
k2
)1  ]1=1 = x(
p
r   k1
k2
)
1 
1 :
Now, if k1  pr , then @(x=ex)1NPV p(ex)@ex > 0 which means that the potential investor should
postpone investing until ex approaches x and invest only if limex!xNPV p(ex)  0.
On the other hand, under pr  k1 + k2, @(x=ex)1NPV p(ex)@ex < 0 which means that the
potential investor should invest immediately as the sunk investment cost (k1 + k2(ex)) is
lower than the present value of the ow of net payments pr .
Investing under scenario D
When 	 > 0; the landholder contemplates investing in a land development project characterized
by capital intensity  < 1. The analysis of the investment timing is identical to the one provided
above for the corresponding case in Scenario C.
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Chapter 6
Discussion
In the rst paper of the thesis, I consider the investment problem of a rm who contemplates
entering an uncertain new market under two conditions. On one hand, an upstream rm with
market power is responsible for the provision of a discrete input that is a prerequisite for the
completion of the project and, on the other, an investment partner undertakes a share of the
sunk investment cost claiming a share of the project in return.
Following the real options approach, I build a stochastic dynamic programming model in
order to study the interaction among the three agents and I nd the following. Firstly, I verify
that the optimal investment timing and, consequently, the maximum value of the opportunity
to invest are reached when the potential investor acts autonomously (vertically integrated case).
On the contrary, in a non-cooperative game-theoretic setting, the presence of any additional
agent involved in the completion of the project causes the delay of the investment which, as is
shown, also implies a smaller value of the investment opportunity. However, despite the fact
that the presence of any additional agent a¤ects the timing and the value of the opportunity to
invest the same way, the magnitude of the e¤ect itself is not the same. Actually, a comparison
between external funding and input outsourcing denotes that the former is always less distorting
than the latter.
Secondly, I focus on the three-agent case and I nd that the synchronous involvement of an
upstream supplier and an investment partner in the project, constitutes the worst-case scenario
since we basically deal with a combination of the corresponding distorting e¤ects. In this case,
the value of the opportunity to invest reaches its minimum whereas the investment threshold
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reaches its maximum.
In the last part of the paper, I present the conditions under which the original non-
cooperative setting is replaced by a Nash bargaining solution and I show that, even in that
case, the optimal investment threshold is unattainable. Actually, the analysis shows that if the
upstream rm is absent (i.e. the input is produced in-house) the project realizes ine¢ ciently
early whereas, if the upstream rm is present (i.e. the input is outsourced) it realizes ine¢ -
ciently late. This is, again, evidence of the importance of the nature of the sunk investment
cost when modelling investment projects characterized by uncertainty and irreversibility, espe-
cially if instead of a single potential investor, an investment partner is also involved in their
completion.
The results of the rst paper of the thesis underline the importance of the nature (en-
dogenous vs. exogenous) of the sunk investment cost when examining investment projects
undertaken not unilaterally but in a supply chain framework. Building on this nding, in the
second paper of the thesis I examine how the presence of an upstream rm with market power
is a¤ecting an investment undertaken in a decentralized setting.
This paper contributes to a growing research area that integrates the theory of irreversible
investment under uncertainty and the literature on asymmetric information and agency con-
icts. According to this body of papers, when an investment project that is characterized by
uncertainty and irreversibility is undertaken in a decentralized setting, the information asym-
metry between the project originator and the project manager will lead to an agency conict.
This results in the postponement of the investment and in the reduction of the value of the
investment opportunity.
My primary interest in this paper is to examine how the analysis changes if the investment
is conditional on the provision of an indispensable input that is exclusively produced by an
input supplier. Using a stochastic dynamic programming model, I identify the cost, the tim-
ing and the value of the opportunity to undertake an investment that i) is characterized by
uncertainty and irreversibility, ii) its completion depends on the provision of a discrete input
that is exclusively produced by an upstream rm with market power and iii) is undertaken in
a decentralized setting. The results suggest that the presence of the external supplier always
makes the investment more expensive which, ceteris paribus, implies the suboptimal postpone-
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ment of its completion as well as a reduced value of the opportunity to invest for the principal,
the agent and the industry as a whole. However, the e¤ect of the upstream rms presence
depends heavily on her/his information endowment. Under traceability in the supply chain,
i.e., when the structure of the supply chain is common knowledge, the presence of the input
supplier restores information symmetry between the delegator and the delegate. The invest-
ment might be more expensive, but the presence of the foreign rm impedes the development
of the agency conict. Similarly, if the supply chain is transparent, that is, if the structure of
the supply chain is common knowledge and the upstream rm is in the position to veriably
observe the realizations of the projects value over time then, information symmetry, optimal
investment timing and a rst-best aggregate value of the opportunity to invest are guaranteed.
Nevertheless, a transparent supply chain does not coincide with the rst best case since the
aggregate value of the investment opportunity is shared between the project originator and the
input supplier.
This work has some limitations that can be addressed in future research. Firstly, in this
paper it is assumed that traceability and transparency do not require any kind of infrastructure
along the supply chain. However, in reality, information sharing is on its own a demanding and
expensive practice. The implementation of a cross-organizational information system is costly,
time-consuming and risky. Partners may not agree on the exact specications of the system
or on how to split the relevant investment costs.1 Secondly, distributional channel phenomena
like the bullwhip e¤ect2 suggest that information sharing is always subject to a certain level of
"noise". This in turn implies that a transparent supply chain is, by construction, unattainable.
It could be interesting to reapproach the present analysis taking explicitly into consideration
noise in the information channels along the supply chain.
Last, in the third paper of the thesis, I examine the e¤ect of passive farming support on
the timing and value of land development projects. According to Article 33 of the treaty estab-
lishing the European Community, the objectives of the CAP are, i) the increase of agricultural
productivity by promoting technical progress and by ensuring the rational development of agri-
1For example, personal computer manufacturers often complain about not being able to get accurate sell-
through data from their resellers since, for instance, some resellers share data on a monthly whereas some others
on a weekly basis (Lee and Whang, 1998).
2The bullwhip e¤ect refers to the case where a small shift in the consumer demand causes a distortion between
sales and orders which is increasing as we move along the supply chain. See e.g. Lee et al. (2004).
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cultural production and the optimum utilization of the factors of production, ii) the guarantee
of a fair standard of living for the agricultural community, iii) the stabilization of the markets
and iv) the guaranteed availability of supplies that reach consumers at reasonable prices.3 In
accordance with these objectives, and thanks to the introduction of direct payments back in
2003, the beneciaries of the CAP enjoy in our days some nancial security while being also
encouraged to respond to market signals. The current version of the policy takes great account
of the reality of an open world and, according to the World Trade Organization, 90% of the
direct payments are regarded as non-trade-distorting.4
A farmer, when passively managing her/his farmland, is basically maintaining the land in
good agricultural and environmental condition according to the SMR and GAEC standards in
order to be entitled to CAP support, without however producing any agricultural commodities.
Several parties have strongly criticized the support paid to passive farmers. According to one
of the main arguments used by the adversaries of the policy, passive farming may hinder rural
development. I have focused on this specic issue and studied how decisions concerning invest-
ment in land development projects are a¤ected by the current policy frame. More precisely, I
analyze the case of a landholder/potential investor who is contemplating investing in a piece of
idle land in order to transform it into farmland. The potential investor needs to decide both
the capital intensity and the timing of the investment given that, once s/he enters the farming
business, s/he will have the opportunity to actively farm the land when the prot margin is
positive, and passively farm the land otherwise.
Three original ndings are presented. First, it is shown that, irrespective of the level of
chosen capital intensity, the support to passive farming is encouraging the acceleration (in
expected terms) of the completion of the investment project. In other words, by implicitly
providing hedging against volatile farming prots, the introduction of decoupled payments will
actually foster investment initiatives and land development. Secondly, I show that the policy
will also incentivize landholders to opt for investment projects characterized by lower capital
intensity. This suggests that the current policy frame induces investment projects that secure
the maintenance of land according to the cross-compliance requirements (under both active and
3http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:11997E033&from=HR
4http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-631_en.htm.
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passive farming) with a lower impact in terms of capacity added, thus limiting the potential
oversupply of agricultural products. In other words, direct payments support land development
in a responsible way, without risking the reappearance of permanent surplus output as in the
1980s.5 Thirdly, I nd that the positive net direct payments increase, through the NPV, the
value of the opportunity to invest. This of course is to be expected since a higher decoupled
payment naturally implies a higher prot ow that is una¤ected by market volatilities which is
then mirrored in the higher aggregate project value.
One limitation of this work is that it is concentrated on the e¤ect that support to passive
farmers has on investment projects. However, the notion of land development is broader since
it incorporates also the corresponding environmental impact as well as changes in social and
animal welfare attributed to the implementation of the policy. The analysis of passive farming
support as a measure that a¤ects land development would benet from further research in that
direction.
5http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/cap-history/index_en.htm
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
The essays comprising this thesis are contributing to the area of investment under uncertainty
and irreversibility. The modern investment theory, suggests that the opportunity to make an
investment decision that is risky and, at least partly, irreversible is analogous to an option
on a real asset in the sense that the potential investor needs to factor in that, at the time
of the investment, the value of the project should fully cover not only the investment cost
but the opportunity cost of reconsidering the investment option in the future as well. While
the frequently used net present value rule does not consider this opportunity cost, the real
options approach shows that it is both substantial and highly sensitive to uncertainty and that,
consequently, it needs to be explicitly taken into consideration.
With the real options approach as my starting point, I focus primarily on investments
undertaken in a supply-chain setting (rst and second paper of the thesis) and, secondarily,
on projects aiming at land development (third chapter of the thesis). More precisely, I have
formulated and examined the following research questions:
1. How vertical relationships and external funding a¤ect investment e¢ ciency and timing?
2. How vertical relationships and agency conicts a¤ect investment e¢ ciency and timing?
3. How are the decoupled from production payments of the current CAP a¤ecting the timing,
the capital intensity and the value of investment projects undertaken by potential farmers
in the EU?
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The common point among the three papers is a potential investor who contemplates under-
taking an investment project characterized by uncertainty and irreversibility when the invest-
ment decision depends on factors beyond the potential investors control. For instance in the
rst paper, the investment opportunity depends on the contribution of an investment partner
whereas, at the same time, a prerequisite for the completion of the project is the procurement
of an indispensable input from an upstream rm with market power. The second paper of
the thesis approaches a similar case where, instead of an investment partnership, I consider a
decentralized setting where the project originator is delegating the investment decision and the
procurement of the needed input to a project manager who enjoys an informational advantage.
Last, in the third paper of thesis, I examine how the policy and legislation governing a certain
industry can a¤ect the behavior of a potential investor.
What di¤erentiates the three papers is the presented industry setting. The results of the
rst two papers are readily applicable to any supply chain framework that satises the relevant
criteria. On the contrary, the third paper is examining the debate that is currently taking place
in EU circles and has to do with the phenomenon of passive farming and its e¤ect on land
development. This variety of applications is evidence of the appropriateness of the real options
approach to describe a number of phenomena providing at the same time insight both to policy
makers and to potential investors.
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